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I. Introduction
In order to create a genuine internal market, the European
Community (EC)' recognized the need for harmonization of mem-
ber states' laws and the creation of community-wide structures for
cooperation.2  With the rising trend in mergers and restructurings,
and the growing need for better cooperation in research and tech-
nology development, the EC is taking steps to harmonize company
laws and facilitate industrial cooperation across borders. As part of
its company law harmonization program, the EC adopted a number
of directives to standardize registration, nullity, ultra vires, and pub-
lic disclosure requirements,3 as well as establish share capital stan-
dards, 4 facilitate mergers between companies in the same member
state, 5 and make accounting and auditing practices more uniform. 6
I The European Economic Community, commonly referred to as the "European
Community," -today consists of twelve member states: Germany, Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Spain, and Portugal.
Their legal relationship is founded in the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. II [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
2 See Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the Council, 1985-
1986 Eur. Parl. Doc. (COM No. 310) 34 (1985) [hereinafter White Paper].
3 First Council Directive of 9 March 1968 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protec-
tion of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards
equivalent throughout the Community, 11 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 65) 8 (1968).
The Eleventh Directive covers disclosure requirements for branches of companies
from other member states. Eleventh Council Directive concerning disclosure requirements in respect
to branches opened in a Member State by certain types of companies governed by the law of another State,
32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 395) 36 (1989).
4 Second Council Directive of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for the
protection of the interests of members and others, are required by the Member States of companies within
the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public
limited-liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making
such safeguards equivalent, 19 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 26) 3 (1976).
5 Third Council Directive of 9 October 1978 based on Article 5 4 (3 )(g) of the Treaty concerning
mergers ofpublic limited liability companies, 21 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. L 295) 36 (1978). The EC
recently adopted antitrust legislation to regulate mergers. Council Regulation of 21 December
1989 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 395) 1
(1989).
The Sixth Directive complements the Third Directive and deals with divisions. Sixth
Council Directive of 17 December 1982 based on Article 54(3 )(g) of the Treaty concerning the division
ofpublic limited liability companies, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 378) 47 (1982).
6 The Fourth Directive and the Seventh Directive deal with accounting, and the
Eighth Directive deals with audits.
Fourth Council Directive of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54(3 )(g) of the Treaty on the annual
accounts of certain types of companies, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 222) 11 (1978). Seventh
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Legislation is under negotiation to harmonize the structure of public
limited companies, 7 simplify cross-border mergers, 8 and create a
uniform code of conduct for takeovers. 9
Despite these efforts, most companies will continue to face bur-
densome legal and fiscal problems if they want to operate on a Com-
munity scale and take advantage of the potential market of 320
million consumers.' 0 For example, a company with establishments
in several EC countries will have to deal with up to twelve different
legal systems and tax codes. Its subsidiaries in other EC countries
must conform to local reporting, tax, and labor laws. Competitors in
the United States or Japan do not face these impediments and can
draw from a wider base of human and financial resources. I Compa-
nies in different member states seeking to merge also face psycholog-
ical obstacles in selecting one corporate nationality over another for
the resulting company.
Over twenty years ago the Commission of the European Com-
munities (Commission) addressed some of these problems in its first
proposal for a "European Company."' 2 The proposal envisioned a
single legal structure by which companies of different member states
could unite and bypass the various national company laws. The re-
sulting European Company would incorporate under and be subject
to a supranational body of law. The legislation was designed to facil-
itate cross-border cooperation and enhance transnational competi-
Council Directive of 13June 1983 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts, 26
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 193) 1 (1983).
Eighth Council Directive of 10 April based on Article 5 4(3)(g) of the Treaty on the approval of
persons responsible for carrying out the statutory audits of accounting documents, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 126) 20 (1984).
7 Proposal for a Fifth Directive Based on Article 54(3 )(g) of the EEC Treaty Concerning the
Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obligations of Their Organs, 15 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 131) 49 (1972), amended by 26 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 240) 2 (1983),
amended by 34 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 7) 4 (1991); 16 BULL. EUR. COMM., Supp. 6/83
(1983).
8 Proposalfor a Tenth Directive Based on Article 5 4 (3 )(g) of the Treaty concerning cross-border
mergers of public limited companies, 28 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 23) 11 (1985); 18 BULL. EUR.
COMM., Supp. 3/85 (1985).
The Commission has considered drafts for a "proposal for a Ninth Directive on links
between undertakings and in particular groups," but the draft has never been published or
formally proposed by the Commission.
9 Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law concerning takeover and other
general bids, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 64) 8 (1989), amended by 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C
240) 12 (1990); 23 BULL. EUR. COMM. 3/89 (1989).
10 EC Proposes Single Incorporation for Operations in 12 Member States, Daily Report For
Executives (BNA) No. 112 (June 10, 1988) [hereinafter Daily Report]. See generally Mac-
Lachlan & Mackesy, Acquisition of Companies in Europe - Practicability, Disclosure, and Regulation:
An Overview, 23 ITcr'L LAw. 373 (1989).
1I See Daily Report, supra note 10.
12 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for European Companies of 1970, 13 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 124) 1 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Proposal].
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tiveness. 13 The campaign for the creation of the internal market
provided a new impetus for the idea of a "European Company" and
prompted the Commission to submit a new proposal for the "Statute
for a European Company" in 1989.14 The proposal may finally make
the supranational company structure a reality.
II. History of the Proposals for a European Company
The EEC Treaty does not expressly provide for the creation of a
pan-European company, however, the idea received support from
the legal community as early as 1959.15 Professor Pieter Sanders
and a panel of experts from the member states provided the Com-
mission with a first draft for a "Societas Europea (SE)" in 1967.16
The Commission submitted its original proposal to the Council in
197017 and revised it in 1975.18 Both versions were cumbersome in
detail 19 and were ultimately abandoned because of the hotly con-
tested worker participation provisions.
The White Paper of June 198520 marked the start of the cam-
paign for creation of an internal market by 1992 and provided the
impetus to "create a legal framework to facilitate cooperation be-
tween enterprises." 2 1 In 1986 the EC adopted the Single European
13 Statute for the European Company: Commission Memorandum to Parliament, the Council and
the Two Sides of Industry, 21 BULL. EUR. COMM., Supp. 3/88, at 5 (1988).
14 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, 32 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 263) 41 (1989); Proposal for a Council Directive complementing the Statute for a
European Company with regard to the involvement of employees in the European Company, 32 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 263) 69 (1989).
15 See Thibierge, Le statut des societes itrangres, in LE STATUT DE L'ETRANGER DANS LE
MARCH9 COMUN 360 (1959). See H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, 2 THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN Eco-
NOMIC COMMUNITY § 54.06, (1990).
16 p. SANDERS, Vorentwurf Eines Statutsftir Europische Aktiengesellschaften (Studien-Reihe
Wettbewerb - Rechtsangleichung der Kommission der Europiischen Gemeinschaften
No. 6) (1967). See Smit & Herzog, supra note 15, § 54.07, at 2-572.
17 1970 Proposal, supra note 12. See 3 BULL. EUR. COMM., Supp. 8/70 (1970).
For legal commentary on the original proposal, see E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EU-
ROPEAN COMPANY LAw: NATIONAL REFORM AND TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION (1971);
Sanders, The European Company on Its Way, 8 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 29 (1971); Lutter, A
European Contractual Group-Company, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 53 (1972); Comment, The Pro-
posed Statute for a European Company, 10 TEX. INT'L L.J. 90 (1975).
For discussion of the Statute's significance for U.S. businesses, see Norton, A Cheshire
Cat Affair: The European-type Company and Its Meaning for the American Enterprise in the European
Community, 6 CORNELL INT'L L.j. 111 (1973); Vagts & Waelde, The Societas Europaea: A Future
Option for U.S. Corporations?, 29 Bus. LAw. 823 (1974).
18 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for European Companies, 8 BULL. EUR.
COMM., Supp. 4/75 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Amended Proposal].
For analysis of the 1975 amendments, see Sanders, The European Company, 6 GA. J.
INT'L & CoMp. L. 367 (1976).
19 The 1970 proposal contained 284 articles and one small annex; the 1975 amend-
ments enlarged the proposal to 337 articles and four annexes. See M. Ellis & P. Storm,
European Company Law, in BUSINESS LAw IN EUROPE 54 (1982 & Supp. 1990).
20 See White Paper, supra note 2. The White Paper listed over 279 legislative proposals
on creating an internal market by 1992 and set out a timetable for their adoption.
21 Id. at 35. The Commission declared the need for "a type of transnational company,
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Act 22 to facilitate adoption of measures in furtherance of its 1992
goals. One year later the European Council of Ministers (Council)
encouraged the institutions to make "swift progress with regard to
the company law adjustments required for the creation of a Euro-
pean company."23 The Commission announced its renewed effort to
establish a European Company structure in a memorandum to the
Council in 1988,24 in which it solicited comments from Parliament,
member states, and both sides of industry.
The Commission's efforts culminated in a new proposal for a
"Statute for a European Company" (Statute) in August 1989.25 The
1989 proposed Statute is simpler than previous versions2 6 and con-
sists of two documents, a regulation dealing with the creation of a
European Company (Regulation)2 7 and a directive describing the
differing forms of worker participation (Directive).28 The proposal
was strategically split into a Regulation and Directive to accelerate its
adoption. The European Company provisions are in the form of a
regulation and therefore would be directly applicable to all member
states.2 9 As no implementing legislation is needed, any eligible com-
independent of national laws, which makes it possible to concentrate substantial assets and
compete with American and Japanese business ..... Id.
22 Single European Act, 30 0J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987).
23 20 BULL. EUR. COMM. 6/87 (1987), at 8 (President's conclusions after European
Council's meeting in Brussels June 29 and 30, 1987).
24 Statute for the European Company: Commission Memorandum to Parliament, the Council and
the Two Sides of Industry, BULL. EUR. COMM., Supp. 3/88 (1988) [hereinafter Memorandum].
For discussion of the Memorandum, see Carreau & Lee, Towards a European Company Law, 9
Nw. J. Iicr'L L. & Bus. 501 (1989).
25 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, 32 0.J. EUt.
COMM. (No. C 263) 41 (1989); Proposal for a Council Directive complementing the Statute for a
European Company with regard to the involvement of employees in the European Company, 32 0.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 263) 69 (1989). For background information about the Statute and
the Commission's Commentary on the Articles, see Statute for a European Company, BULL. EUR.
COMM., Supp. 5/89, at 7 (1989) [hereinafter BULLETN].
For legal commentary on the 1989 proposal, see Donald, Company Law in the European
Community: Toward Supranational Incorporation, 9 DICK.J. Iirr'L L. 1 (1991); English, Company
Law in the European Single Market, 1990 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1413 (1990); Kolvenbach, EEC Com-
pany Law Harmonization and Worker Participation, 11 U. PA.J. Icr'L Bus. L. 709 (1990); Abelt-
shauser, Towards A European Constitution of the Firm: Problems and Perspectives, 11 MICH. J. Icr'L
L. 1235 (1990).
26 The 1989 proposal contains only 137 articles in the Regulation, and 13 articles in
the Directive. Cf supra note 18. Some of these articles have been deleted in the 1991
amendments.
27 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, 32 OJ. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 263) 41 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Regulation]. For the Commission's Com-
mentary on the Articles, see BULL. EUR. COMM., Supp. 5/89, at 13-31 [hereinafter Commentary
to 1989 Regulation].
28 Proposal for a Council Directive complementing the Statute for a European company with re-
gard to the involvement of employees in the European company, 31 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 263) 8
(1989) [hereinafter 1989 Directive]. For the Commission's Commentary on the Articles, see
BULL. EUR. COMM., Supp. 5/89, at 33-35 [hereinafter Commentary to 1989 Directive].
29 The EEC Treaty states: "Regulations shall have a general application. They shall
be binding in every respect and directly applicable in each Member State." EEC Treaty,
supra note 1, art. 189, 298 U.N.T.S. at 79.
1991]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
pany could opt to come under the Statute.30 The employee partici-
pation requirements are in the form of a directive thereby leaving the
method of implementation open to the member states.3 ' Anticipat-
ing opposition stemming from member states' vastly different-labor
law traditions, the Commission sought to offer greater flexibility in
adapting the employee involvement schemes to the national systems.
The Regulation is designed to overcome the lack of uniformity
among the member states' company laws and provide a single Euro-
pean company structure.3 2 It offers companies operating in more
than one EC country the opportunity to elect a Community system of
incorporation in lieu of any one member state's law to govern its
transnational activities.33 It is not designed to override the various
national systems, but rather to offer an attractive alternative for busi-
nesses operating on a Community scale.3 4 The option will be most
useful to large public companies, but smaller companies will be able
to qualify as well. 3 5 In addition to the convenience of the Commu-
nity-wide structure of incorporation, the Statute also contains tax in-
centives and disclosure and accounting advantages.36
An important and controversial aspect of the proposed Com-
pany Statute is its "social dimension."3 7 In order to form a Euro-
pean Company, the company must adopt one of the Directive's three
models of employee participation in the management and strategic
development of the enterprise.38  Under the Directive, member
states can limit the choice of participation models for companies reg-
istering its territory.39 Absent such limitation by a member state, a
company can chose which of the three models of employee participa-
tion will best suit its needs. 40 It is hoped that the flexible approach
to employee participation in the European Company Statute will
promote consensus on employee involvement in general and aid in
the eventual adoption of the more comprehensive and more con-
tested Fifth Directive on employee participation in public limited
30 See infra notes 90-101 and accompafiying text discussing eligibility requirements.
31 Under the EEC Treaty, "Directives shall bind any Member State to which they are
addressed, as to the result to be achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a compe-
tence as to form and means." EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 189, 298 U.N.T.S. at 79.
32 BULLETIN, supra note 25, at 7.
33 The drafters hoped to overcome what they described as "major psychological ob-
stacles" by avoiding that companies be forced to chose the legal structure of any one par-
ticular state. Id.
34 Id. at 8.
35 See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text discussing minimum capital
requirements.
36 See infra notes 184-98 and accompanying text discussing tax incentives.
37 See infra notes 219-41 and accompanying text discussing employee involvement in
SEs.
38 See BULLETIN, supra note 25, at 8.
39 Id. at 9.
40 Id.
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companies. 4 1
In January 1991 the European Parliament (Parliament) held its
First Reading of the European Company Statute.42 It approved the
Commission's 1989 proposal and voted for a series of amend-
ments. 43 Taking many of Parliament's suggestions into account, the
Commission amended its proposal in May 1991.44 The proposal is
now before the Council, awaiting the adoption of a common posi-
tion. The proposal will then be resubmitted to Parliament for a Sec-
ond Reading before going to the Council for final action. If adopted,
it will enter into force sometime after-January 1, 1993.
45
This Comment will analyze the 1991 amended proposal for a
Statute for a European Company. It discusses the regulation's key
provisions for an EC-wide company structure and addresses some of
the concerns over the accompanying Directive on employee involve-
ment. At the outset, the Comment looks at the controversial legal
bases of the Statute. The section which follows focuses on company
-structures in the European Community. It begins by describing the
41 See Proposalfor a Fifth Directive Founded on Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty Concerning
the Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obligations of Their Organs, 15 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 131) 49 (1972), amended by 26 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 240) 2 (1983),
amended by 34 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 7) 4 (1991). The proposed Fifth Directive is in-
tended to harmonize the overall structure of limited liability companies in the EC. It sets
out rules for general meetings, drawing up and auditing annual accounts, and corporate
governance by a one-tier or two-tier board system. The most controversial aspect of the
Fifth Directive is its emphasis on worker participation. It offers public limited companies a
choice of three models for employee participation in corporate decision-making. For
closer analysis, see English, supra note 25, at 1497-1512. Little action has been taken on
the Fifth Directive in recent years, with the exception of an amendment made in January
1991 to reflect progress made on removing barriers to cross-border takeovers. See Euro-
pean Report, Business Brief No. 1628, European Information Service, Nov. 10, 1990.
42 The European Company Statute is subject to the new legislative procedure pro-
vided for under the Single European Act, called the "cooperation procedure." See Riesen-
feld, The Single European Act, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 371, 376-77 (1990). The
procedure enhances cooperation between the European Parliament and the Council and
permits the Council to adopt legislation by a qualified majority. Commission proposals
coming under the procedure are subject to two readings at the Parliament and Council.
id. at 376.
43 34 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 48) 72 (1991)(regulation); 34 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C
48) 100 (1991) (directive) [hereinafter Parliament First Reading]. See Company Law: Parliament
Approves Draft Directive and Regulation on European Company Statute, Monthly Report on Eu-
rope, Europe Information Service at 16 (Feb. 1991).
44 Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, 34 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 176) 1 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Amended Regulation] and Amended Propo-
sal for a Council Directive complementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the in-
volvement of employees in the European company, 34 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 138) 8 (1991)
[hereinafter 1991 Amended Directive].
For the Commission's explanations of the 1991 amendments to the Regulation, see
Explanatory Memorandum, COM(91) 174 final/2 -SYN 218 1-25 (May 28, 1991) [hereinafter
Explanatory Memorandum to 1991 Regulation].
For the Commission's explanations of the 1991 amendments to the Directive, see Ex-
planatory Memorandum, COM(91) 174 final - SYN 219 1-7 (May 6, 1991) [hereinafter Explan-
atory Memorandum to 1991 Directive].
45 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 137; 1991 Amended Directive, supra note
44, art. 12(1).
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structures currently available and identifying the need for a Euro-
pean Company structure. Next, it surveys the major aspects of the
proposed Regulation and points out ambiguities and points of con-
tention. Part III addresses employee involvement in the European
Community. It reviews the EC's problematic history with initiatives
on worker participation and surveys the prospects for success of the
current Directive. It discusses the models of worker participation in
the Directive, highlights some of the provisions which Parliament re-
quested be amended, and draws comparisons to recent legislation on
a European Works Council. The section concludes with an overview
of the contrasting traditions and reactions of Germany and Britain to
EC worker participation initiatives. Finally, the Comment assesses
the impact the Statute is likely to have, and suggests that despite its
weaknesses, the Statute represents a major step forward in the EC's
effort to promote European-wide industrial cooperation among com-
panies and industrial democracy between companies and their
employees.
III. Legal Basis of the Statute
The Commission's choice of legal basis for the European Com-
pany Statute caused great controversy when it was published in July
1989.46 Some viewed the Commission's choice as "cleverly exploit-
ing obscurities" in the EEC Treaty to avoid a veto at the Council and
increase its own powers. 47 Although the original 1970 draft was
based on article 235 of the EEC Treaty48 and required approval by
unanimous vote of the Council, the 1989 proposal for the Regulation
on the European Company Statute is based on article 100a and the
Directive on worker participation is based on article 54(3)(g), both of
46 Four EC countries expressed opposition to the Commission's choice of legal base
of the Statute: Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands, and the Republic of Ireland. EC
Company Law Plan Prompts Battle Between Member States, Fin. Times, July 13, 1989, at 26.
The American Chamber of Commerce also questioned the Statute's legal basis. Obser-
vations of the EC Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium on the European Com-
pany Statute, May 21, 1990, §§ 13-16, at 4-5 [hereinafter American Chamber Observations]. See
also Perell & Farren, The Proposed European Company Statute, ATLANTIC J. AM. CHAMBER OF
CoM. (U.K.) 17 (1991).
47 See EEC Democracy: Power Games, THE ECONOMIST, July 22, 1989, at 39 [hereinafter
THE ECONOMIST].
48 Article 235 serves as a residual basis for legislation:
If any action by the Community appears necessary to achieve, in the
functioning of the Common Market, one of the aims of the Community in
cases where this Treaty has not provided for the requisite powers of action,
the Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the Com-
mission and after the Assembly has been consulted, shall enact appropriate
provisions.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 235, at 91. This article has already served as the legal
basis for one company law proposal, namely the European Economic Interest Grouping
Regulation (EEIG), discussed infra notes 68-82 and accompanying text. See Carreau &
Lee, supra note 24, at 505. It is important to note that the EEIG regulation was proposed
in 1985, before the Single European Act amended the EEC Treaty.
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which allow for qualified majority voting. The implications of which
voting method is required are quite significant. If unanimity is re-
quired, any one member state has veto power over the legislation.
Furthermore, the member states must be unanimous in order to
change this method of voting.49 Thus, a statute's prospects for pas-
sage may sometimes hinge on the Commission's determination of its
legal basis.
Until 1987 the vast majority of Council voting had to be unani-
mous. However, in 1987 the Single European Act amended the EEC
Treaty and extended qualified majority voting to a number of areas
relevant to the creation of an internal market. 50 The Act added arti-
cle 100a to authorize majority voting for harmonization measures
"which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the
internal market."' 51 Commentators have questioned the Commis-
sion's use of article 100a in the case of the Regulation for a Euro-
pean Company because the proposal aims to create a supranational
body of law rather than to "approximate" national laws. 52
There is also concern that use of article 100a for a measure
touching on tax and worker participation violates article 100a(2)'s
exclusion of fiscal and labor matters. 53 Such matters almost always
49 One commentator calls this the "Catch 1992." THE ECONOMIST, supra note 47, at
39. The Council of Ministers can rarely "muster the unanimity to overrule the Commis-
sion's choice . . .[and] usually accept [it]." Id.
50 Single European Act, 30 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 169) 1 (1987) (effective July 1,
1987). The Single European Act added articles 8a, 8b, and 8c to the EEC Treaty and
confirmed the 1985 White Paper's objective and timetable for completing the internal
market. Article 8a states:
The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively estab-
lishing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992, in
accordance with the provisions of this Article and of Articles 8b, 8c, 28,
57(2), 59, 70(1), 84, 99, 100A and 100B and without prejudice to the other
provisions of this Treaty.
30 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1, 5 (1987).
51 30 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1, 9 (1987). The article reads as follows:
100a
1. By way of derogation from Article 100 and save where otherwise pro-
vided in this Treaty, the following provisions shall apply for the achievement
of the objectives set out in Article 8a. The Council shall, acting by a qualified
majority on a proposal from the Commission in co-operation with the Euro-
pean Parliament and after Consulting the Economic and Social Committee,
adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their
object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.
2. Paragraph I shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those relating to the
free movement of persons nor to those relating to the rights and interests of
employed persons.
d.
52 See Abeltshauser, supra note 25, at 1239-41; Crossick, Wither the European Company
Statute?, 140 N.L.J. 1799, 1799 (1990); American Chamber Observations, supra note 46, § 14, at
4; Perell & Farren, supra note 46, at 17.
53 Article 100a(2) excludes the following provisions from the Council's qualified ma-
jority voting powers: "fiscal provisions, those relating to the free movement of persons
[or] those relating to the rights and interests of employed persons." Both Britain and
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 16
require unanimous Council decisions. 54 The appropriateness of arti-
cle 100a depends on whether the tax and employee participation
provisions in the Regulation are seen as merely incidental to the
company law proposal or whether they fall within article 100a(2)'s
prohibition. Critics claim that article 235, a residual provision for
Community objectives for which no other Treaty basis exists, pro-
vides the only appropriate basis for the Regulation. 55
The Commission's use of article 54(3)(g) for the Directive on
employee involvement has also been criticized. Article 54(3)(g) car-
ries out the EEC Treaty's right of establishment by authorizing
Council directives to ensure that national company laws designed to
protect "the interests of members and others" are not inconsis-
tent.56 Although article 54 deals with freedom of establishment, the
preamble of the Directive makes no mention of the freedom of estab-
lishment and the provisions on employee involvement are arguably
more tied to company management than to company establish-
ment.57 Furthermore, it is unclear whether the rights of employees
are protected by the article. Professors Smit and Herzog propose
that article 54( 3)(g) is limited to the protection of shareholders and
third parties such as creditors. 58 Yet Professor Kolvenbach suggests
that the language of article 54(3)(g) is broader and includes "credi-
tors, customers, potential investors, and workers." 59
Germany raised concerns that the tax and employee participation provisions in the Statute
may come within this exception. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 47, at 39. See also Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry (U.K.), Proposal for a European Company Statute: A Consultative
Document, Dec. 1989, at 8 [hereinafter DTI Consultative Document].
54 See generally Smit & Herzog, supra note 15, at §§ 117-136 (social provisions), §§ 95-
99 (tax provisions) (1976 & Supp. 1985).
55 DTI Consultative Document, supra note 53, at 8; American Chamber Observations, supra
note 46, § 14. See also Pantaleo, The European Company Law as an Instrument of Social Policy, 16
J. EUR. Bus. 50 (1990). Cf. Donald, supra note 25, at 27-29.
56 EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 54(3)(g), at 39. Article 54(3)(g) provides for:
coordinating, to the extent that is necessary and with a view to making them
equivalent, the guarantees in Member States from companies within the
meaning of Article 58, second paragraph, for the purpose of protecting the
interests both of members of such companies and of third parties.
Id.
Article 54(2) authorizes the use of majority voting for such harmonization measures.
Article 54(2) states:
In order to implement the general programme or, if no such programme
exists, to complete one stage towards the achievement of freedom of estab-
lishment for a specific activity, the Council, on a proposal of the Commission
and after the Economic and Social Committee and the Assembly have been
consulted, shall, until the end of the first stage by means of a unanimous vote
and subsequently by means of a qualified majority vote, act by issuing
directives.
EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 54(2).
The combination of these two articles has served as the foundation for the harmoniza-
tion of company laws by directives. See Kolvenbach, supra note 25, at 710-17.
57 See American Chamber Observations, supra note 46, § 15. But see Abeltshauser, supra
note 25, at 1249 (discussing arguments for a broader interpretation of article 54 (3 )(g)).
58 Smit & Herzog, supra note 15, § 54.04[fQ.
59 Kolvenbach, supra note 25, at 711.
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Some commentators question whether the Directive's three
models for employee participation are "functionally equivalent," as
required by article 54(3)(g). 60 The article is aimed at reducing dis-
parity in member states' laws, yet the Directive offers flexibility in
providing member states three considerably different models for em-
ployee participation. One can argue that the Directive does not
make employee participation "equivalent throughout the Commu-
nity" and therefore cannot be based on article 54 (3)(g). Article 100
may provide an alternate legal basis for the Directive, but it has
stricter procedural requirements than article 54.6 1 Otherwise,
residual authority under article 235 remains available.62
Member states can attempt to challenge the legal basis before
the European Court ofJustice.63 Yet the court has never once ruled
against the Commission in a suit charging that the Commission ex-
ceeded its legislative authority.64 Private parties may also challenge
the legal basis. For example, parties dealing with a European Com-
pany might attempt to avoid performance of a contract or pierce the
limited liability by alleging that the SE's formation was defective due
to the improper legal basis of the Statute. 65
IV. Company Structures
A. Structures Currently Available
At present, companies have limited options for cross-border co-
operation. A complete assets merger is still practically impossible.6 6
The "legislation of certain Member States does not allow, or does
not provide for, such mergers, and other Member States subject such
operations to the unanimous approval of the shareholders of the
60 Abeltshauser, supra note 25, at 1241.
61 Smit & Herzog, supra note 15, § 54.04[f]. See also American Chamber Observations,
supra note 46, § 15.
62 Britain believes that article 235 is the only appropriate basis for the Regulation and
Directive. See DTI Consultative Document, supra note 53, at 8.
63 THE EcONOMIST, supra note 47, at 39.
64 Id.
65 Farren, Overview of the Major Provisions of the European Company Statute and Parliament's
Opinion, paper presented at American Chamber of Commerce (U.K.) Seminar, London,
England, March 3, 1991.
66 The proposed Tenth Company Law Directive is intended to make cross-border
mergers more practical, but the proposal has not made much headway. Proposal for a Tenth
Directive Based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty Concerning Cross-Border Mergers of Public Limited
Companies, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 23) 11 (1985). The proposed Tenth Directive sup-
plies uniform rules for setting up a merger and specifies the applicable law for the contents
of "draft terms of a cross-border merger," the protection of creditors, prior legal or ad-
ministrative supervision of the legality of the merger, the date the merger becomes effec-
tive, civil liability of experts preparing and implementing the merger, and the
circumstances under which the merger will be declared null. Id. at 13. See English, supra
note 25, at 1488-94. The proposal received a First Reading in the Parliament, but the
Council has not taken any further action. Coopers & Lybrand, Company Law, Euroscope
July 25, 1991, at 12 (available on Lexis).
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company being acquired."'67 Six years ago the EC created a cross-
border partnership-like company structure for smaller companies
called the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG). Larger
companies have no equivalent structure and are forced to use incon-
venient mechanisms such as the creation of holding companies and
joint ventures to accomplish equivalent goals.
1. EEIG
In 1985, the Council created the EEIG as a new legal entity for
non-public cross-border enterprises employing less than 500 em-
ployees. 68 The EEIG Regulation took effectJuly 1, 1989, and within
one year the Commission reported about eighty five different EEIGs
had been formed.69 Although the availability of the entity is limited
by its many qualifications, the EEIG can be especially useful to
smaller companies who want to share the costs and risks of cross-
border business. 70
An EEIG must have at least two members from different mem-
ber states. 7' It may not have more than 500 employees, 72 nor may it
invite investment from the public. 73 An EEIG can be formed by
companies, firms, or other legal entities by entering into a written
contract in accordance with the law of a member state. 74 Once regis-
tered in a member state, the EEIG is governed by that state's labor
and other national laws not covered in the regulation, but is free to
operate in any of the EC countries without further registration. 75
Furthermore, the EEIG is available only for limited purposes: "its
purpose is not to make profits for itself ... [rather] [i]ts activity shall
be related to the economic activities of its members and shall not be
67 BULL. EUR. COMM., Supp. 3/85, at 5 (1985). See Smit & Herzog, supra note 15,
§ 54.09.
68 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic Interest
Grouping (EEIG) 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 199) 1 (1985) [hereinafter EEIG Regulation].
See 20 BULL. EUR. COMM. 1 Supp. 3/87. See generally EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEREST
GROUPINGS (D. van Gerven & C. Aalders 1990); Wooldridge, The Draft Regulation on the
European Economic Interest Grouping, EUR. Bus. L. 70 (1984); The European Economic Interest
Grouping (EEIG), European File No. 6/89 (1989); Murphy, The European Economic Interest
Group (EEIG): A New European Business Entity, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 65 (1990).
69 Fin. Times, July 30, 1990, at 2. "More than half [the EEIGs formed] are in com-
mercial activities like marketing, purchasing and import/export, 12 are in services ranging
from audiovisual and transport to professional training and the financial sector, and 14
consist of groupings of professionals like law firms." Id.
70 For an overview of the EEIG usefulness and applicability under each of the twelve
member state's national laws, see EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPINGS, supra note
68.
71 EEIG Regulation, supra note 68, art. 4.
72 Id. art. 3(2)(c).
73 Id. art. 23.
74 Id. art. 4(l)(a).
75 Fargue & Bergman, Europe 1992: A National and a Supranational Process, 203 N.Y.L.J.
5, Apr. 26, 1990, at 6, col. 3.
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more than ancillary to those activities." '76 Thus, the EEIG is
designed to carry on the present activities of the participants instead
of providing a vehicle to begin new, unrelated activities.
The EEIG offers several advantages. If a company qualifies as
an EEIG, its participants share risk as partnerships in most countries.
They hold joint and several liability which can be apportioned in the
formation contract. 77 Another advantage of this structure is the flex-
ibility of financing. An EEIG does not have to be formed with capi-
tal; it may use subscriptions or loans to finance its operations. 78 A
major disadvantage of the EEIG structure is the tax treatment. Prof-
its will be taxed in the hands of its members under the rules of the
home country.79 This may lead to disparate treatment of EEIG
members under their various national tax systems.
In sum, the EEIG represents a first step towards promoting
cross-border cooperation in the field of company law. One EEIG ex-
pert explained that the structure is likely to be used for " 'low risk'
agency run businesses like lawyers, accountants, [public relations]
companies; 'high risk,' high value projects such as equipment financ-
ing and big construction projects; and 'low risk horizontal group-
ings' within legal groups of European companies which might
provide common transport or research and development services on
an EC-wide basis."80 Two large European television companies have
already taken advantage of the EEIG structure in order to promote
high definition televisions. 8' Other consortia in the service area
have also expressed interest in forming an EEIG.8 2 Nonetheless, its
utility is very limited by the eligibility and purpose requirements.
Although it provides unprecedented flexibility and convenience for
smaller companies, it cannot promote large-scale Community-wide
cooperation.
2. Holding Companies, Joint Ventures
Currently, large public companies with cross-frontier operations
cannot form EEIGs and are left with inconvenient options such as
creating a holding company 3 or joint venture.8 4 In both instances
the cooperating companies retain their separate legal identities.
76 EEIG Regulation, supra note 68, art. 3(1).
77 Id. arts. 24, 26(2).
78 Id.
79 Id. arts. 20, 40.
80 Fin. Times, July 30, 1990, at 2.
81 Fin. Times, July 5, 1989, at 35. The companies are Philips and Thompson.
82 Id.
83 Memorandum, supra note 24, at 12. Companies wishing to merge would form a fi-
nancial holding company made up of the shareholders of the subholding companies in
each of the operations' states. Then assets would be transferred within this group of com-
panies. For example, if companies A and B wanted to join forces, their organization might
look as follows:*
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These options also require application of two or more legal systems
and raise serious tax disincentives.8 5 Such "associated companies"
face double taxation "if the profits of one of the companies have
been adjusted upwards by the tax authorities in one state without a
corresponding downward adjustment in the country in which the
other company is located."86 Also, there are numerous bilateral
treaties in effect exempting foreign profits and foreign losses from
taxation in the home state. Companies cannot offset losses by
branches abroad even if they are making profits in the home state.
Some analysts blame the failure of some early European joint ven-
tures on this lack of cross-border tax consolidation.8 7 Others point
out that the "Delaware effect," whereby companies chose headquar-
Holding Company
made up of shareholders of A and B
I I
I I
sub-holding sub-holding sub-holding
company company company
I I
S I II
I I t II I
A' B' A" B" A' B'
*reprinted from Memorandum, supra note 24, at 12.
84 The joint venture differs from other business undertakings by two or more persons
in that it is usually formed to carry out a particular venture, dissolving upon the comple-
tion thereof. No formality is usually required. Principals of partnership law are somewhat
applicable, although there is sometimes said to be no general mutual agency. The parties
to ajoint venture are in a fiduciary relationship. Liability is unlimited. Absent characteris-
tics of an "association," a joint venture is usually taxable as a partnership. H. HENN &J.
ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, § 49 (3d ed.
1983).
If companies A and B formed a joint venture their relationship would look as follows:
A B
I I
I I
Joint Venture
85 Memorandum, supra note 24, at 10.
86 Id.
87 Fin. Times, May 15, 1989, at 6. The experience of Gevaert and Bayer, who once
jointly-owned Afga-Gevaert is illustrative:
Bayer and Gevaert were for 14 years the joint mother companies of the two
Afga-Gevaert companies, one in Belgium, and one in Germany. But they
faced an impossible situation in the early 1980s when the German company
was making heavy losses that could not be set off against the equally heavy
profits of the Belgian company... . 'On its profits, the Belgian company had
to pay 53 percent local corporation tax, a further 20 percent withholding tax
on its dividends, leaving only one third of profit left, out of which to give
capital increases to the loss-making German company.'.. . Had Afga-Gevaert
been allowed to consolidate its accounts, its German losses would have re-
duced or eliminated its Belgian tax bill.
Id. (quoting Mr. Andre Leysen, head of Gevaert).
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ters mainly for tax reasons, is a likely result if tax provisions are not
included in a supranational company structure. 88
B. Proposed Regulation for a European Company
The Regulation is designed to simplify cross-border reorganiza-
tion options and overcome "psychological difficulties" inherent in
having to choose one member state's legal system to govern opera-
tions in other states.8 9 The Regulation would enable parties to form
a public, limited liability legal entity at the Community level. It envi-
sions an EC company structure which would be more widely avail-
able than the EEIG structure and offers certain tax incentives. It is
the most significant structure designed to promote large-scale cross-
border cooperation between companies to date.
1. SE Eligibility
Under the proposed Regulation, companies with activities in dif-
ferent EC countries would be able to combine to create a single legal
entity called a "Societas Europea (SE)." 9 0 Creation of an SE entity
would be completely optional and would co-exist with national com-
pany laws. The Regulation requires at least two entities (this in-
cludes companies as well as most types of public and private legal
entities) to form an SE.9 ' In order to be eligible, an entity must have
its registered office and central administration in the Community,
possess a cross-border dimension, and fulfill minimum capital
requirements.
The founding entities must have both their registered offices
88 Companies operating EC-wide frequently decide to incorporate in countnies such
as Luxembourg, which offer national tax advantages. European Parliament Gives Initial Ap-
proval to Proposalfor European Company Status, INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 5, at 172 (Jan. 30,
1991).
89 BULLETIN, supra note 25, at 38.
90 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, at 3. For example, an SE formed by compa-
nies A and B might look as follows:*
European Company
I
I I
A'B' A"B" A'"B'"
*reprinted from Memorandum, supra note 13, at 12.
The initials "SE" must precede or follow the name of a European Company to iden-
tify it and also distinguish it from public limited companies incorporated under national
law. See 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, arts. 1, 11.
91 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 2. The Regulation is available to enti-
ties which article 58 of the EEC Treaty broadly defines as "companies": "The term 'com-
panies' shall mean companies under civil or commercial law including cooperative
companies and other legal parties under public or private law, with the exception of non-
profit-making companies." EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 58.
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and "central administration" in the Community.92 This requirement
may restrict access for non-EC companies with subsidiaries in the
EC, if the Commission determines that its "central administration" is
not in the EC. Yet, "[e]ven with this restriction, a non-EC corpora-
tion could form a European Company joint subsidiary with an EC-
limited company which was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the non-EC
company ... [thereafter] the EC subsidiary could transfer its shares
in the European joint subsidiary to the non-EC corporation. ' 93 The
American Chamber of Commerce and the Union of Industrial and
Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE) have urged the
Commission to change the requirement to enable companies with
either their registered office or their central administration in the EC
to be eligible to form an SE.94 However, neither Parliament nor the
Commission has taken any action on these suggestions.
As amended, the Regulation lists a broad range of EC entities
which have a sufficient "cross border dimension" to form an SE:
public limited companies, private limited companies, other legal en-
tities governed by public or private law, and other SEs. Public lim-
ited companies having their central administration in different
member states can form an SE by merging or by forming a holding
company. 95 Public limited companies with a subsidiary or branch
office in a member state other than that of their central administra-
tion can also form an SE by forming a holding company. 96 The 1989
proposal required that at least two of the founding entities have their
central administrations in different member states; now having a sub-
sidiary or branch in a different member state will suffice. The 1991
amendments also allow a public limited company of a single member
state to transform itself into an SE if it has a subsidiary or branch in
another member state. 97
The most substantial change of the 1991 amendments enables
smaller, private limited companies to form an SE. Private limited
92 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 2(1), (2). "Central administration" is
roughly equivalent to "nerve center" in U.S. law.
93 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, COMMENTARY ON THE STATUTE FOR THE EUROPEAN
COMPANY 71-72 (1990).
94 A main concern the American Chamber was that "EC subsidiaries of non-EC com-
panies should have equal access to the [European Company Statute]." American Chamber
Observations, supra note 46, at §§ 6, 7, at 3. See Farren, Company Law Issues: The European
Compahy Statute and Parliament's Opinion, paper presented at American Chamber of Com-
merce (U.K.) Seminar, London, England, March 5, 1991, at 2 [hereinafter Company Law
Issues].
UNICE was concerned that "[c]ompanies which have their central administration
outside the Community may not participate directly in the formation of a European Com-
pany ... [this] ... may give companies from outside the EEC the impression that they are
being discriminated against." UNICE, European Company Statute Position § 15 (Nov. 20,
1989) [hereinafter UNICE Position].
95 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 2(1).
96 Id. art. 2(l)(a).
97 Id. art. 2(3). See also Parliament First Reading, supra note 43, amendment 9.
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companies account for a major proportion of economic activity in
the Community and Parliament urged the Commission to widen the
access of the SE to include these companies. 98 Article 2(1)(a) now
permits private limited companies to form an SE by forming a hold-
ing company if "at least two of them have their central administra-
tion in different member states, or have a subsidiary or a branch
office in a member state other than that of their central administra-
tion." 99 Otherwise, any legal entity governed by public or private
law can form an SE by forming a joint subsidiary subject to the same
conditions as formation of a holding company.' 00 Finally, an SE it-
self can combine with other SEs to form an SE and an SE may also
set up one or more subsidiaries in the SE form.' 0 '
Another important consideration in SE eligibility is the mini-
mum capital requirement. SEs must have minimum subscribed capi-
talization of ECU 100,000,102 twenty-five percent of which needs to
be paid up front.' 03 This requirement was reduced from the 1975
draft's minimum of ECU 250,000 "to make it easier for small busi-
nesses to take advantage of the Statute."' 0 4 SEs engaged in certain
types of activity, such as banking and insurance, would remain sub-
ject to any greater capital requirements under the laws of the mem-
ber state where they are registered.' 0 5
2. SE Formation
The amended Regulation sets forth four methods of formation:
merger, creation of an SE holding company, creation of a joint sub-
sidiary, and conversion of a public limited company.' 0 6 Participants
in these formation schemes are called "founder companies,"' 0 7
meaning those meeting the eligibility requirements outlined in the
preceding section. The Regulation draws a further distinction in
98 Parliament First Reading, supra note 43, amendment 7. See also Commentary to 1989
Regulation, supra note 27, art. 2.
99 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 2(la).
100 Id. art. 2(3).
101 Id. art. 3. The 1989 proposal prevented SEs from setting up SE subsidiaries "to
avoid the creation of 'cascades' of SEs." Commentary to 1989 Regulation, supra note 27, art.
3(3). The Commission reversed its position at the request of Parliament. See Parliament
First Reading, supra note 43, amendments 10, 11.
102 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 4(1). This is about $130,000. The 1991
amendments made clear that "the minimum capital was the minimum subscribed capital,
that is to say the capital which the founder companies have undertaken to provide rather
than the assets of the company, which will fluctuate constantly." Explanatory Memorandum to
1991 Regulation, supra note 44, art. 4, at 2.
103 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 38 (2); Commentary to 1989 Regulation,
supra note 27, art. 4.
104 Commentary to 1989 Regulation, supra note 27, art. 4.
105 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 4(2).
106 Id. title II, arts. 12-37a.
107 Id. art. 12. This term was devised to encompass all the types of eligible entities,
not just public limited companies. See Commentary to 1989 Regulation, supra note 27, art. 12.
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that only public limited companies can avail themselves of the
merger, holding company, or conversion methods of formation,'1° 8
whereas both public and private entities can form an.SE by the joint
subsidiary method.' 0 9 Thus, it is expected that SEs will be most fre-
quently formed by the joint subsidiary method.
a. Merger
Formation by merger entails the "winding up" of the founder
companies by transfering all of the assets and liabilities to the Sltin
exchange for shares." 0 The merger process is based on the pro-
posed Tenth Directive on cross-border mergers."' The shares of
the founder company are wound up or liquidated in a non-judicial
way. Shareholders of the founder companies are then given the op-
tion to receive shares in the SE or to receive up to ten percent of the
shares' nominal value in cash."12 The merger has the effect of trans-
ferring all of the assets and liabilities of the founder companies to
the SE (which can be relied upon as against third parties), making
the shareholders of the founder companies the new shareholders of
the SE and rendering the founder companies defunct."13 The
founder companies must draw up "draft terms of merger"' "1 4 to be
voted upon at the general meeting. 15 The shareholders of each of
the founder companies must approve the draft terms of merger and
the instrument of incorporation in accordance with article 7 of the
Third Directive on national mergers and have the right to inspect
documents in accordance with article 11 of the Third Directive." 6
Creditors and security holders of the founder companies are pro-
tected by the applicable law of the member state." 17 Legality of the
merger will be supervised in part by the laws of the member state
governing the founder companies" 8 and in part by the laws of the
member state of the proposed registered office of the SE. 1 9 If no
supervision occurs and the laws of the member state in which the SE
108 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 2(1). Private companies would first
have to form a public company under the laws of a member state. See Commentary to 1989
Regulation, supra note 27, art. 12.
109 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 2(2). This method is "open to all legal
bodies governed by public or private law, whether or not they are in company fori and
indeed whether or not they have a legal personality, and regardless of whether they carry
on a commercial activity or just an activity with an ultimate economic purpose." BULLETIN,
supra note 25, at 13.
110 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 17(1).
III See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
112 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 17(1).
113 Id. art. 27.
114 Id. art. 18.
115 Id. art. 22.
116 Id.
117 Id. art. 23.
118 Id. art. 24.
119 Id. art. 24a.
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has registered provide grounds for nullity; the merger can be de-
clared null and void.' 20 The Regulation also provides a shortened
merger procedure for a founder company which holds 90% or more
of the shares in another founder company.' 2'
b. Holding Company
Founder companies can also form an SE by creating a holding
company.122 Unlike a merger, formation of an SE holding company
would have no effect on the existence of the founder companies.' 23
Formation of an SE under this method is conditioned upon the ex-
change of at least fifty one percent of the voting shares of the found-
ing companies for shares in the SE holding company.124 The
founder companies must'draw up draft terms of formation specifying
the requisite percentage of shares to be transferred to the SE and
submit the terms to the general meeting of each founder company
for approval.' 25
Prior to the 1991 amendments, the Regulation required that all
shares be exchanged, thus, the SE holding company would be the
sole owner of shares in the founding companies.' 2 6 "As originally
conceived, the operation would have involved a compulsory contri-
bution of capital by shareholders who did not wish to take part - a
situation contrary to the legal traditions of many countries."' 27 As
amended, the shareholders have a period of three months from the
general meeting to assign their shares to the SE; only if the requisite
percentage of shares are assigned can an SE be formed.' 28
c. joint Subsidiary
The third method of SE formation involves creating a joint sub-
sidiary.' 2 9 This method is not limited to public limited companies
and is open to any legal entity governed by public or private law.' 30
It may also be used by one SE combining with another SE or by an
SE to create a subsidiary in the form of an SE.131 The 1991 amend-
ments simplified the procedure for forming an SE by the joint sub-
sidiary method by deleting provisions about draft terms of the
120 Id. art. 29.
121 Id. art. 30a.
122 Id. art. 31(1).
123 Id.
124 Id. art. 31(2). See also Parliament First Reading, supra note 43, amendment 40.
125 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 31(2), (3).
126 Commentary to 1989 Regulation, supra note 27, art. 31.
127 Explanatory Memorandum to 1991 Regulation, supra note 44, arts. 31, 32.
128 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 31a.
129 Id. art. 34.
130 Id. arts. 34, 2(2).
'3' Id. arts. 3(2), (3).
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formation and approval of formation. 132
d. Conversion of a Public Limited Company
The 1991 amendments add a fourth method of formation to al-
low public limited companies already incorporated under one mem-
ber state and having a subsidiary or branch in another member state
to transform themselves into SEs.' 33 This conversion does "not give
rise to the company being wound up nor to a new legal person being
created."' 3 4 The provision calls for the drawing up of draft terms of
conversion which must be approved by a general meeting of the
company. 135
3. Registered Office of the SE
The "statutes of the SE"' 36 must designate the place in the EC
where the central administration is designated as the "registered of-
fice." '3 7 This office will reflect the "siege r6el," or true headquarters
of the company, not merely its place of incorporation.13 8 The SE's
registered office plays a crucial role because the Statute often makes
the SE explicitly subject to the laws of the member state where it is
registered or provides that those laws will apply when the Statute is
not applicable. ' 39
The 1991 amendments address problems which might otherwise
arise if an SE wishes to transfer its registered office. Usually transfer-
ring corporate headquarters from one member state to another
would require first liquidating the company. Yet under the Regula-
tion a transfer "will not result in the SE being wound up or in the
creation of a new legal person."' 40 The Regulation only requires
that an SE whose transfers involves a change in the member state law
governing the SE publish notice of the transfer.' 4 ' If a transfer re-
132 1989 Regulation, supra note 27, arts. 34, 35.
133 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, arts. 37a, 2(3). See also Parliament First Read-
ing, supra note 43, amendment 9.
'34 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 37a.
135 Id.
136 The 1991 amendments define "statutes of the SE" as "both the instrument of in-
corporation and, where they are the object of a separate document, the statutes of the SE."
Id. art. 4a.
137 Id. art. 5. An SE must register in the Member State where it has its registered
office. Id. art. 8(l). The registration procedure is modeled after that for EEIGs, however,
an SE cannot register until a model of employee involvement is selected according to pro-
cedures set out in the Directive. Id. art. 8(3). Notice that an SE has been formed or has
transferred its registered office will be published in the OficialJournal of the European Com-
munities. Id. art. 10.
138 Commentary to 1989 Regulation, supra note 27, art. 5. See Smit & Herzog, supra note
15. Most member states use the siige r6el concept, except for the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom, who adhere to the principle of the place of incorporation. Id.
'39 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 7(2)(b).
140 Id. art. 5a(l).
141 Id. art. 5a(2).
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suits in a change of the chosen method of employee involvement, the
accompanying Directive ensures that "the model of participation
which applied before the transfer may be changed only by the same
process of negotiation [to select a model of participation] . . . which
... must precede the formation of an SE."' 142 These amendments
respond to concerns that an SE could change its registered office to
avoid obligations imposed by the laws of the member state where it
has its registered office, especially if the change is intentionally made
to avoid a member state's restrictions on the choices for employee
involvement.
4. Management Structure
The Regulation requires the SE to adopt one of two types of
management structures: a management board and a supervisory
board (two-tier system) or an administrative board (one-tier sys-
tem). 143 This provision reflects the dual governing body structures
for public limited companies proposed by the Council in the amend-
ment for the Fifth Directive. Although the founder companies can
chose which of these structures will apply, the 1991 amendments al-
low the member state to restrict the choice of the SEs registered in
its borders to one of the two alternatives.' 44 The Commission ex-
plained that this amendment "will permit greater reliance on na-
tional law in respect to the functioning of public limited
companies."'145 The SE's statutes must set forth the chosen manage-
ment structure and provide for a general meeting of shareholders. 146
a. Two-Tier System
In a two-tier system, the management board has the power to
manage and represent the SE. 147 The statutes of the SE will desig-
nate the number of members on its management board.' 48 The
members of the management board are appointed and removable by
the supervisory board 49 and must provide the supervisory board
with information and respond to inquiries.' 50 The two boards are
entirely separate and no member may serve on both boards at one
time, except in the event of a vacancy on the management board.' 5 '
In that case, the supervisory board may nominate one of its members
142 Explanatory Memorandum to 1991 Regulation, supra note 44, art. 5(a), referring to
article 3(7) of the Directive.
143 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, title IV, arts. 61-100.
144 Id. art. 61.
145 Explanatory Memorandum to 1991 Regulation, supra note 44, art. 61.
146 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 61.
147 Id. art. 62(1).
148 Id. art. 62(4).
149 Id. art. 62(2).
150 Id. art. 64.
151 Id. art. 62.
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to fill the vacancy, during which time that member's supervisory
board duties are suspended.152
The supervisory board's role is to supervise the duties of the
management board.15 3 The statutes of the SE provide the required
number of members on the supervisory board, but a member state
can specify the required number for SEs registered in its territory. 154
The members of the first supervisory board may be appointed by ,the
statutes of the SE.' 55 Otherwise, members are appointed and re-
moved at the general meeting of shareholders,1 56 and, if article 4 of
the Directive is applicable, 157 between one third to one half of the
board shall be appointed by the employees or the employees' repre-
sentatives.' 58 This two-tier board system is based on the German
dual system of corporate governance.' 59 When combined with the
co-determination model of employee involvement under the Direc-
tive, 160 the supervisory board and its employee members can play a
substantial role in governing the SE.
b. One- Tier System
In a one-tier system, the administrative board ensures the man-
agement of and represents the SE. 16 The statutes of the SE shall set
the number of members on the administrative board.' 62 Members
are appointed and removed at the general meeting of shareholders,
and if article 4 of the Directive is applicable, 163 the administrative
board must have at least three members and between one third to
one half of them shall be appointed by the employees or the employ-
ees' representatives. 64
The administrative board can delegate its managerial functions
152 Id. art. 62(3).
153 Id. art. 63(1).
154 Id. art. 63(3).
155 Id. art. 63(2).
156 Id.
157 See infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text discussing "supervisory board or ad-
ministrative board" model of employee involvment.
158 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 63(2), and 1991 Amended Directive, supra
note 44, art. 4. The 1991 amendments make clear that the chairman of the supervisory
board will be chosen from the shareholder appointed board members. 1991 Amended Regu-
lation, supra note 44, art. 65(1); Explanatory Memorandum to 1991 Regulation, supra note 44, at
17.
159 See English, supra note 25, at 1498-503.
160 See infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text.
161 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 66(1).
162 Id. art. 66(l)(a).
163 See infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text discussing "supervisory board or ad-
ministrative board" model of employee involvement.
164 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 66(3). As with the supervisory board,
the chairman of the administrative board will be chosen from the shareholder appointed
board members. Id. art. 67(a); Explanatory Memorandum to 1991 Regulation, supra note 44, at
17.
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to one or more of its members as an executive board. 165 The admin-
istrative board can also delegate certain responsibilities to non-
board members if authorized by the statutes or decided at the gen-
eral meeting.' 66 This delegation to executive members would oper-
ate much like the two-tier structure, where the executive members
would be supervised by the administrative board.' 67 The full
board's supervision entails the executives reporting to and providing
information to the non-executive board members.' 68 Under this sys-
tem, the non-executive members of the administrative board clearly
have more power. The Regulation states that the scope of the dele-
gated responsibilities can be conditioned in the statutes and that the
delegation can be revoked at any time.'169
c. Article 72
Both systems are subject to some common rules on the rights,
duties, and liabilities of the board members.' 70 Among these rules is
a provision requiring prior authorization for implementation of im-
portant decisions.' 7 ' Article 72 requires the management board of a
two-tier system or the executive members of the administrative
board to obtain authorization from the supervisory board or the full
administrative board before taking action on certain matters of com-
pany strategy and development.172 The article sets out certain oper-
ations which would require prior authorization:
(a) any investment project requiring an amount more than the per-
centage of subscribed capital fixed in accordance with subparagraph
(e);
(b) the setting up, acquisition, disposal or closing down of under-
takings, businesses or parts of businesses where the purchase price
or disposal proceeds account for more than the percentage of sub-
scribed capital fixed in accordance with subparagraph (e);
(c) the raising or granting of loans, the issue of debt securities and
the assumption of liabilities of a third party or suretyship for a third
party where the total money value in each case is more than the per-
centage of subscribed capital fixed in accordance with subparagraph
(e);
(d) the conclusion of supply and perfor mance contracts where the
total turnover provided for therein is more than for the previous
financial year fixed in accordance with subparagraph (e);
(e) the percentage referred to in subparagraphs (a) to (d) shall be
165 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 66(2).
166 Id. art. 66(2).
167 Commentary to 1989 Regulation, supra note 27, art. 66.
168 Id. art. 67.
169 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 66(2).
170 See, e.g., id. arts. 68 (terms of office), 69 (conditions of membership), 72 (operations
requiring prior authorization), 74 (rights and obligations), 76 (quorum, majority), 77 (civil
liability).
171 Id. art. 72.
172 Id.; Commentary to 1989 Regulation, supra note 27, art. 72.
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determined by the statutes of the SE. It shall not be less than 5%,
nor more than 257. 173
This list is non-exclusive and the SE may set out additional decisions
requiring prior approval in its own statutes. 17 4 The 1991 amend-
ments allow member states to align the provisions governing SEs
registered in its territory with those applicable to public limited com-
panies under its national law. 17 5 Furthermore, member states can
allow the supervisory or administrative board of the SEs registered
in its territory to choose to come under the national law provisions
instead of those in article 72.176
Article 72 has been the source of considerable criticism because
of its nexus with the worker participation provisions in the Direc-
tive.' 77 The "important" decisions listed in article 72 are also those
entitling the employees to be informed and consulted under the Di-
rective. ' 78 Depending on the model of worker participation selected
by the SE, any article 72 decision "may be effected only after [the
employees have] been informed and consulted."' 79 Both article 72
of the Regulation and articles 5 and 6 of the Directive are ambiguous
as to when the respective "prior authorization" and employee "infor-
mation and consultation" must occur.' 8 0 The 1989 proposal re-
quired that the interaction occur "before implementation."
Parliament addressed this ambiguity and suggested that employees
"be informed, without delay, and consulted at a suitably early stage
... before any [article 72 decision is taken] ... and to have access to
documents relating thereto."'1' The Commission chose not to
adopt the language suggested by Parliament, thus it appears the in-
teraction could still occur after the decision but before
implementation.
Commentators have leveled criticisms against article 72 similar
to those directed against the Directive on worker participation. Crit-
ics generally argue that the authorization and consultation proce-
dures are likely to bog down decision-making and prevent
173 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 72(1).
174 Id. art. 72(2).
175 Id. art. 72(3).
176 Id. art. 72(4).
177 See Company Law Issues, supra note 94, at 5.
178 1991 Amended Directive, supra note 44, arts. 5(2)(d) & 6(2)(c).
179 Id. The employee rights to consultation and information apply when the "separate
body" (Directive, art. 5) or collective bargaining (Directive, art. 6) models of employee
participation are selected under the Directive. When co-determination (article 4) is se-
lected, the employees are represented on the supervisory board itself, and thus do not
need special consultation. The Commentary to article 4 states that "the power to author-
ize certain operations (listed in article 72 of the Regulation) will rest with a majority of the
members ... [the] minority will be informed and consulted ... [and] be able to express its
view, even if it is not in a position to decide on the operation itself." Commentary to 1989
Directive, supra note 28, at art. 4.
180 Company Law Issues, supra note 94, at 5.
181 Parliament First Reading, supra note 43, art. (5)(2)(c), at 103.
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management from responding quickly to changes in the business en-
vironment.t 8 2 They allege that such procedures will tie the hands of
managers and threaten competitiveness of SEs.' 83
5. Tax Incentives
The main incentive for companies to incorporate as European
entities are the tax provisions. 184 Although an SE will be subject to
the laws of the member state in which it is registered, the Regulation
allows SE parent companies to deduct the losses from "permanent
establishments" (or branches) in member states or non-member
states from their taxable income in the state where the SE is regis-
tered.' 85 This provision will protect the SE by altering the present
treatment under some bi-lateral treaties' 86 which exempt foreign
profits and losses from taxation in the home state. The Statute al-
lows profits from abroad to be included in taxable income up to the
amount of the losses from abroad.' 87 This provision is designed to
protect member states from being denied tax on profits up to the
amount of deducted losses.' 88
The Statute's tax scheme is designed to reflect an SE's pan-Eu-
ropean activity and legal status.' 89 Although the tax provisions gen-
erally appeal to businesses, member state governments may be
reluctant to allow any inroads on their tax sovereignty.' 90 At pres-
ent, most member states (except Britain, Ireland, and in limited
cases France) do not allow deductions of foreign losses. 19 1 Some
fear that the provisions do nothing to prevent companies operating
in heavily taxed countries from using the offset to cut their tax bills if
they move to another country.' 92 Others raised initial objections
that the Statute discriminates against non-SE companies.' 93 In re-
182 See UNICE Position, supra note 94, § 27, at 6 (provisions "could lead to a
bureaucratisation of relations between management : . . and the supervisory board");
American Chamber Observations, supra note 46, §§ 33-34, at 7 (information and consultation
of article 72 decisions must not amount to a right of veto and management should be able
to "override the obligation altogether... in certain cases of urgent commercial need").
183 Company Law Issues, supra note 94, at 5.
184 See 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, title IX, art. 133.
185 Id. art. 133(1).
186 Fin. Times, May 15, 1989, at 6.
187 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 133(2).
188 Memorandum, supra note 24, at 12.
189 See id.
190 Fin. Times, July 5, 1989, at 35. See, e.g., DTI Consultative Document, supra note 53.
The British government sees the "centralized harmonization as unnecessary and poten-
tially harmful ... [and believes] [miarket forces will bring about such harmonization as is
necessary." Id. at 9. Cf. Fin. Times, March 5, 1990. Labor groups in Britain support the
tax measures in the Statute, in hopes this will provide incentives to industry to increase
employee involvement. Id.
191 Memorandum, supra note 24, at 16.
192 Fin. Times, July 13, 1989, at 26, col. 2.
193 UNICE Position, supra note 94, § 15, at 3; American Chamber Observations, supra note
46, § 6, at 3.
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sponse the Commission proposed a directive in November 1990 with
analogous tax provisions to apply to all businesses. 94
Parliament voted to drop the favorable tax treatment currently
offered in the proposal.' 95 It prefers that tax harmonization occur
through the forthcoming Directives which would be applicable to all
companies.' 96 Furthermore, Parliament expressed doubts as to the
legality of the proposed Regulation's legal basis (article 100a) if the
tax provisions were left in the proposal.' 97 Fiscal policy is usually
based on articles 95 to 99 of the EEC Treaty and requires unanimous
voting.' 98 However, the Commission decided not to make any
amendments to the 1989 tax provisions.
6. Accounting and Disclosure
The Statute also offers SEs simplified accounting and disclosure
provisions.' 9 9 The provisions require SEs to "draw up annual ac-
counts comprising the balance sheet, the profit and loss account and
notes on the accounts,1 200 and to "draw up an annual report which
must include at least a fair review of the company's business and of
its position." 20' Although the Fourth Directive (annual accounts) 202
and the Seventh Directive (consolidated accounts) 20 3 will apply' to
SEs, the Statute provides some exemptions and modifications. It
would make the more liberal options in the accounting Directives
194 See Company Taxation: Proposed Directives on Removal of Tax Barriers to Re-
structuring Tabled, European Report, European Information Service, Dec. 1, 1990, at 5.
195 European Parliament Gives Initial Approval to Proposal for European Company Status, BNA
Int'l Trade Rep., Jan. 30, 1991, at 172 (available on Lexis).
196 Id. After more than twenty years of discussion, the EC is now beginning to make
substantial progress in company tax harmonization. In July 1990 the Council adopted a
series of three tax directives. The first aims to make mergers more feasible by allowing
deferral of the capital gains tax on the assets of the absorbed company until the assets are
realized through break up or liquidation. The second eliminates double taxation of divi-
dend transfers between parent companies and subsidiaries in different member states by
exempting such payments from withholding tax. The third directive creates a standing
committee to 'arbitrate transfer pricing and double taxation disputes. Company Tax Relief
Obtained, 2 EURECOM: MONTHLY BULL. EUR. ECON. & FIN. NEWS, July 1990, at 1.
In November 1990 the Commission proposed two more directives to remove disin-
centives to company restructuring across the EC. One proposal extends the exemption
from withholding tax on dividend transfers to transfers of royalties and interest payments
between parent companies and subsidiaries in different EC countries. The other proposal
allows companies to offset losses from subsidiaries abroad against profits in the parent
company's home state. EC Tax Commissioner Introduces Proposals to Lift Barriers to Company
Restructuring, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1842 (Dec. 5, 1990).
197 Id.
198 See Smit & Herzog, supra note 15, at §§ 95-99 (tax provisions).
199 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, title V, arts. 101-12.
200 Id. art. 101(1).
201 Id. art. 102(1).
202 Fourth Council Directive of 25 July 1978 based on Article 5 4(3)(g) of the Treaty on The
Annual Accounts of Certain Types of Companies, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 222) 11 (1978).
203 Seventh Council Directive of 13June 1983 Based on Article 54(3 )(g) of The Treaty on Con-
solidated Accounts, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 193) 1 (1983).
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available to SEs. Yet under the Statute a member state will not be
able to impose additional disclosure requirements beyond those in
the Directives. 20 4 This has raised criticism from governments who
currently require more disclosure by their own corporations than do
the Directives. 20 5 Some are concerned that the liberal disclosure re-
quirements of the Statute would make the SE a vehicle to operate
with minimum disclosure. 20 6
Banks and insurance companies are exempted from the liberal-
ized disclosure modifications available for other SEs. 20 7 The Statute
specifically requires banks and insurance companies to comply with
national laws implementing the Directive on bank accounts20 8 and
the proposed Directive on accounts of insurance companies. 209 As
to the SEs there would be no differential accounting and disclosure
treatment within a member state.
7. Items Not Covered
The Statute spells out certain areas which are not covered by the
Regulation. These include: "(i) social security and employment law,
(ii) taxation and competition law, (iii) intellectual property law, [and]
(iv) insolvency law."'2 10 Community law and member states' laws are
applicable in these areas. At the request of Parliament,2 1' the Com-
mission's 1991 amendments clarified the order of precedence of the
laws applicable to SEs: (1) the Regulation, (2) where expressly au-
thorized in the Regulation, the statutes of the SE, (3) the laws of the
member state where the SE is registered, (4) the statutes of the SE
(those provisions in accordance with the laws governing public lim-
ited companies in the member state where it is registered).212 The
current proposal represents a significant change from earlier propos-
als which completely precluded application of member state law. 21
3
The Commission pointed out that the laws of the member states will
204 DTI Consultative Document, supra note 53, annex E, at 1.
205 For example, a British public limited company would be required to disclose more
information than an SE registered in Great Britain. Id. See (British) Companies Act of
1985 (schedules 4-7) and Companies Act of 1989.
206 See INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED AccouNTANTs OF ENGLAND & WALES, RESPONSE TO
DTI CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT (March 1990).
207 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 113.
208 Council Directive of 8 December 1986 on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts of
Banks and Other Financial Institutions, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 372) 1 (1986).
209 Proposal for a Council Directive on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts on Insur-
ance Undertakings, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 131) 1 (1987).
210 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, intioduction.
211 See Parliament First Reading, supra note 43, art. 7, at 77.
212 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, aft. 7(1).
213 Several commentators describe the current proposal's references to national law as
"escapism." See Ellis & Storm, supra note 19, at 55. They argue that "the Commission
tries to avoid such thorny problems as those connected with groups of companies and
taxation. Of course this does not solve those problems. It rather exacerbates them in view
of the great differences between national laws." Id.
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become more and more harmonized through Council directives and
now refers SEs to the applicable law of the member state where it has
its registered office.2 14 No doubt the Commission hopes references
to national law will make the Statute more palpable to the member
states, especially in areas such as taxation, winding up, and
liquidation.
On the other hand, commentators have criticized the Statute
generally as leaving too much open to national laws. 2 15 They point
out that the gaps in the legislation to be filled in by national laws
undermine its utility as a Community-wide structure.2 16 It is argued
that non-EC companies will have difficulty in applying some areas of
the various member states' laws for their SE subsidiaries.2 17 Ironi-
cally, earlier drafts were criticized as being too complex because they
attempted to deal with a wide range of technical issues such as insol-
vency and winding up.2 18 Perhaps the Commission's decision to
leave certain technical items to member states' laws should be
viewed as a pragmatic approach since it does nothing to preclude
harmonization of these areas through subsequent EC legislation and
may ensure sooner adoption of a structural foundation for cross-bor-
der cooperation.
V. Employee Involvement
A. EC History of Employee Involvement
The EC has long supported the idea of a "social dimension" 2 19
to the Common Market. The major legislation in this area is the So-
cial Charter 220 with its accompanying Social Action Programme 221
which sets forth measures to implement the rights discussed in the
214 Commentary to 1989 Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 7.
215 See, e.g., Ellis & Storm, supra note 19, at 56; European Parliament Gives Initial Approval
to Proposalfor European Company Status, BNA Int'l Trade Rep.,Jan. 30, 1991, at 172; Company
Law Issues, supra note 94, at 4; Perell & Farren, supra note 46, at 17; DTI Consultative Docu-
ment, supra note 53, at 10.
216 Ellis & Storm, supra note 19, at 56.
217 European Parliament Gives Initial Approval to Proposal for European Company Status, 8
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 172 Uan. 30, 1991).
218 Carreau & Lee, supra note 24, at 502 n.9.
219 See The EEC's Social Dimension: Louder than Words, THE ECONOMIST, July 8, 1989, at
38. From a philosophical point of view, the "social dimension" is seen as a counterbalance
to the "abrasive" competition promised by 1992. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITIES, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EMPLOYMENT, SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND EDUCATION, SO-
CIAL EUROPE: THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF THE INTERNAL MARKET, SPECIAL EDITION (1988).
220 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, COM (89) 568 final (Nov. 29,
1989). The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers [hereinafter
Social Charter or Charter]. See Bercusson, The European Community's Charter of Fundamental
Rights for Workers, 53 MOD. L. REV. 624 (1990).
The Charter provides a bill of twelve rights to EC workers: free movement, fair pay,
improved working conditions, social protection, collective bargaining, vocational training,
equal treatment between men and women, worker consultation and participation in man-
agement, health and safety protection in the workplace, protection of children and adoles-
cents, protection of the aged, and protection of the handicapped. See Dowling, Worker
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Charter. These documents contain a variety of provisions for Com-
munity-wide social rights in areas such as social security, minimum
wage, worker participation and consultation, pension benefits, mu-
tual recognition for technical qualifications, health and safety stan-
dards, part-time labor benefits, parental leave, and vocational
training. 22 2 Most of the provisions, except laws on health and safety
and on vocational training, 223 require unanimity in the Council of
Ministers. 22 4 At present the Charter is far from creating legally en-
forceable social rights. The Charter would not be binding as would a
regulation or directive, but would create "a political obligation. "2 2 5
At the EC Summit in December 1989 the Council "adopted" the
Charter over Britain's veto. 22 6 As a result, there is dispute as to the
legality of the Charter's adoption and the weight member states must
give it.227 The Commission hopes to get around some of Britain's
opposition to the social dimension by including the worker participa-
tion provisions in the proposed Directive in the European Company
Statute which can be adopted by a qualified majority of Council
Ministers .228
The current worker participation provisions in the Statute are
protegees of the infamous "Vredeling" Directive 2 29 and the Fifth Di-
rective.23 0 The Vredeling proposal would have required EC employ-
Rights in the Post-1992 European Communities: What "Social Europe" Means to United States-Based
Multinational Employers, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 564, 594-614 (1991).
221 Communication from the Commission Concerning its Action Programme Relating to the Imple-
mentation of the Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers, (COM No. 89) 568 final
(Nov. 29, 1989). See Hepple, The Implementation of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social
Rights, 53 MoD. L. REV. 643 (1990).
222 The EEC's Social Dimension: Louder Than Words, THE ECONOMIST, July 8, 1989, at 38.
Storm Could Gathers Over the Social Charter, Fin. Times, June 12, 1989, at 18, col. 3.
223 These provisions are covered by the new Single European Act's article I 18a. Arti-
cle 118a provides authority to adopt legislation by qualified majority voting to encourage
improvements in "the working environment," such as health and safety and training laws.
See Hepple, supra note 221, at 644-51.
224 The Charter is otherwise based on article 117 of the EEC Treaty, which requires
unanimous voting on laws to improve working conditions and standard of living for work-
ers. See Harris, Social Charter: The Legal Basis, 139 NEW L.J. 764, 764 (1989).
225 1992 Under Construction: Different Visions, THE ECONOMIST, July 8, 1989, at 38.
226 Fin. Times, Jan. 3, 1990, at 7.
227 See Dowling, supra note 220, at 590-94.
228 See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text discussing legal base of the Statute
and majority voting. See also Fin. Times, July 8, 1989, at 38.
229 Proposalfor a Council Directive on Procedures for Informing and Consulting the Employees of
Undertakings with Complex Structures, in Particular Transnational Undertakings, 23 0.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 297) 3 (1980), amended by 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 217) 3 (1983); BULL.
EUR. COMM., Supp. 2/83 (1983). See Kolvenbach, EEC Directive on Information and Consulta-
tion of Employees (Vredeling-Proposal), 10 INT'L Bus. LAw. 365 (1982); BIANPAIN, BLANQUET,
HERMAN & MOuTY, THE VREDELING PROPOSAL: INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION OF EM-
PLOYEES IN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1983); Hoffmann & Grewe, The Vredeling Proposal
of the European Commission, 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 329 (1984); Note, The Vredeling Directive: The
EEC's Failed Attempt to Regulate Multinational Enterprises and Organize Collective Bargaining, 20
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 967 (1988).
230 Proposed Fifth Directive on the Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and
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ers and non-EC multinationals to inform workers on issues such as
the company's financial situation and strategy and to consult workers
before taking action which would have affected them significantly. 23'
Soon after the proposal was published in 1980, it received over-
whelming criticism from member states232 and commentators 233 and
was abandoned in 1986.
While the Vredeling Directive only dealt with information and
consultation, the Fifth Directive was meant to bring worker participa-
tion into the company's structure.23 4 The Fifth Directive provides
employees with supervisory rights in management with a preference
for a two-tier board structure. 235 The Fifth Directive would require
public limited liability companies of 1,000 or more workers to adopt
one of four models of worker participation.23 6 Its models are almost
analogous to those now contained in the proposed Statute for a Eu-
ropean Company. The crucial difference is that the SE structure and
its attendant worker participation requirements are optional,
whereas the Fifth Directive's requirements would be mandatory. For
the time being, the Commission and Council have decided to set
Obligations of Their Organs, 15 .J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 131) (1972), amendedby 26 0J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 240) 2 (1983), amended by 34 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 7) (1991); BULL EUR.
COMM., Supp. 6/83 (1983). See Conlon, Industrial Democracy and EEC Company Law: A Review
of the Draft Fifth Directive, 24 INr'L & COMp. L.Q. 348 (1975); Battaille, The European Commu-
nity Proposals on Worker Participation in the European Economic Community, 3 Nw. J. INr'L L. &
Bus. 517 (1981); Hopt, New Ways of Corporate Governance: European Experiments with Labor
Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1338 (1984). For the British view, see
Montgomery, The European Community's Draft Fifth Directive: British Resistance and Community
Procedures, 10 CoMp. LAB. L.J. 437 (1989).
231 Carreau & Lee, supra note 24, at 510.
232 See, e.g., Britain, Income Data Services, IDS Study: Vredeling & The Fifth, No. 313 (1984).
The British Government stated that "the introduction of Community-wide legislation in
this area would contribute nothing to the establishment of the common market in goods
and services, but would increase employers' costs and damage the competitive position of
industry in the Community." Id. at 16.
233 See, e.g., Transnationals and EEC Law, 98 EUR. INDUs. REL. 21, 21-23 (1982). The
employer's confederation, UNICE, criticized the plan as "neither necessary nor useful."
Id. at 22. Employer members of the Economic and Social Committee called the draft "a
rigid Community instrument, imposing identical provisions everywhere, [and] would dis-
rupt existing relations without any justification." Id. The United States introduced three
bills aimed at limiting the impact of the Vredeling draft on U.S. multinationals operating
in Europe. Id. at 23. The Council of American Chambers of Commerce, Europe and Med-
iterranean (EUROMED) strongly criticized the draft as "creat[ing] an institutional struc-
ture for virtually endless delaying tactics, during which corporate decisions cannot be
implemented." Id.
See also Kolvenbach, EEC Directive on Information and Consultation of Employees (Vredeling
Proposal), 10 Ir'L Bus. LAw. 365, 368-70 (1982); Hoffmann & Grewe, The Vredeling Proposal
of the European Commission, 20 STAN. J. Icr'L L. 329, 350 (1984); Docksey, Information and
Consultation of Employees: The United Kingdom and the Vredeling Directive, 49 Mon. L. REV. 281,
313 (1986).
234 Docksey, Employee Information and Consultation Rights in the Member States of the Euro-
pean Communities, 7 CoMp. LAB. L. 32, 34 (1985).
235 Hopt, supra note 230, at 1345; Hadden, Employee Participation - What Future for the
German Model?, 3 COMPANY LAw. 250, 250 (1982).
236 Hopt, supra note 230, at 1346.
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aside the Fifth Directive and focus on the worker participation provi-
sions in the Statute. 237 It is hoped that the agreed upon framework
of the Statute could then be applied to the Fifth Directive and in-
crease its likelihood for passage. 238 This puts additional pressure on
the EC to secure adoption of the Company Statute in the near future.
The Statute for the European Company has contained provi-
sions relating to worker participation since its inception in 1970.239
In the memorandum issued one year prior to the proposed Statute's
publication the Commission reiterated its "view [that] worker partici-
pation is essential not just as a matter of social rights, but as an
instrument for promoting the smooth running and success of the en-
terprise through promoting stable relationships between managers
and employees in the workplace." '240 The Parliament has continu-
ously supported the Commission's stance on worker participation. 24'
B. Proposed Directive on Employee Involvement
The Statute directs member states to "take the necessary meas-
ures to enable employees of the SE to participate in the supervision
and strategic development of the SE in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Directive."2 42 The Directive provides three models of
employee involvement and a procedure to ensure that an SE cannot
be formed without adopting one of these models.2 43 The member
states can decide how the models will be applied to SEs registering
within its borders 244 and can restrict the choice of models available
in its country. 245 This provides some flexibility to the member states
to shape the methods of employee involvement in ways appropriate
to their national tradition of labor relations.
Given the member states' determination as to suitable national
forms of employee involvement, the management boards or adminis-
trative boards of the founder companies and the representatives of
the employees will try to reach an agreement as to which model will
be applied in the SE.2 46 The 1991 amendments provide that their
237 In September 1990, the Council announced that it was "leaving to one side" its
discussions on the Fifth Directive until agreement was reached on the employee participa-
tion Orovisions in the Statute for the European Company. Perell & Farren, supra note 46,
at 17.
238 Id.
239 Memorandum, supra note 24, at 13.
240 Id.
241 The Parliament even voted for an amendment to the initial proposal which would
have mandated the supervisory board structure. This structure is available as one of three
options in the current proposal and is generally considered the most participatory. See id.,
at 14.
242 1991 Amended Directive, supra note 44, art. 2.
243 Id. art. 3(2).
244 Id. art. 3(4).
245 Id. art. 3(5).
246 Id. art. 3. The 1991 amendments set out the procedure that management and the
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negotiations "shall consider the legal, economic and social conse-
quences of the formation of the SE and any measures to be taken
with respect to the employees in order to arrive at an agreement on
the model of participation which is to apply to the SE."'24 7 If.an
agreement is reached, the text will be submitted to the general meet-
ing called to approve the formation of the SE.2 48 The shareholders
must ratify the agreement before the SE can be registered. 249
If no agreement can be reached, the employees shall state in
writing "why... the formation of the SE is contrary to the employ-
ees' interests and what measures should be taken with respect to the
employees. ' 250 This writing, together with a report by the manage-
ment or administrative boards of the founder companies, will be sub-
mitted to the general meeting called to approve the formation of the
SE.2 5 1 In this case, the shareholders have the ultimate power to
chose the model of participation. 252 The model can subsequently be
changed only if the board and the employees so agree.253
1. Three Models of Worker Participation
The Directive's three possible models of employee involvement
are: (1) participation in supervisory or administrative boards;2 54 (2)
representation through a separate body; 25 5 and (3) other models
agreed upon by the management and employees. 256 These models
are intended to involve employees in the supervision and strategic
development of the SE, but not in the day-to-day running of the
firm. 25 7
a. Supervisory Board or Administrative Board
The first model assures employees minority representation on
the supervisory board (in a two-tier board system) or on the adminis-
employees must undertake to agree upon a model before the SE can be formed or
changed. Explanatory Memorandum to 1991 Directive, supra note 44, art. 3.
247 1991 Amended Directive, supra note 44, art. 3(l).
248 Id. art. 3(1).
249 Id. art. 3(2); 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 8(3).
250 1991 Amended Directive, supra note 44, art. 3(l)(b).
251 Id. art. 3(l)(b).
252 Id. art. 3(2). This provision differs from the 1989 proposal which gave the ultimate
power to chose the model of participation to the management or administrative boards.
Id., former art. 3(1). Given that an SE cannot be formed until it has adopted one of the
models, the Commission thought it would be unrealistic to give the employees veto power
to prevent the formation of the SE. Commentary to 1989 Directive, supra note 28, art. 3.
253 1991 Amended Directive, supra note 44, art. 3(3). The 1989 proposal required share-
holder approval for a change in the model of participation. 1989 Directive, supra note 28,
art. 3(3).
254 See infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text.
255 See infra notes 264-72 and accompanying text.
256 See infra notes 273-77 and accompanying text.
257 Commentary to 1989 Directive, supra note 28, at art. 2.
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trative board (in a one-tier board system). 258 Employees will be able
to appoint or remove between one-third and one-half of the board
members and the shareholders (who would otherwise elect the entire
board) will appoint or remove the remaining two-thirds to one-half
of the board members.259 As an alternative, the board members will
be appointed or removed by the board itself, with the nomination or
objection of the shareholders and employees. 260 All board mem-
bers will enjoy the same rights and obligations, regardless of whether
selected by the employees or the shareholders. 261 It is noteworthy
that "decisions requiring prior authorization" under article 72 of the
Regulation must be authorized by a majority of the board, and under
this model, the employees will never have the majority. Nonetheless,
the commentary states that the minority of the board is entitled to be
informed and consulted on the decision.262 In the event of deadlock,
the 1991 amendments provide that a chairman of the board ap-
pointed by the general meeting of shareholders will be able to cast
the deciding vote.2 63
b. Separate Body
The second model provides for employee representation in a
body separate from the governing body.2 64 All employees of the SE
and its branches are entitled to elect and serve in this representative
capacity. 265 The separate body is entitled to receive the same infor-
mation which the supervisory board receives from the management
board in a two-tier board system and the administrative board re-
ceives from those to whom it has delegated certain management du-
ties. 26 6 Thus, "[t]he management board or the administrative board
of the SE shall at least every three months inform the separate body
of the progress of the SE's business and of its prospects taking ac-
258 1991 Amended Directive, supra note 44, art. 4.
259 Id. art. 4(I). This option is based on the German system of co-determination.
Under German law, co-determination ("Mitbestimmung") applies to companies with more
than 500 workers. Gesetz iber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer, 4 May 1976,
Bundesgesetzblatt 1976, Teil I 1153. See generally, W. Kolvenbach & P. Hanau, Federal Re-
public of Germany, in HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN EMPLOYEE CO-MANAGEMENT (1989) [hereinaf-
ter HANDBOOK].
260 1991 Amended Directive, supra note 44, art. 4(11) (variation is based on the Dutch
system of co-optation).
. 261 Commentary to 1989 Directive, supra note 28, art. 4. Article 74 of the Regulation enti-
ties each board member to "the same rights and obligations, without prejudice .. " 1991
Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 74.
262 Commentary to 1989 Directive, supra note 28, art. 4.
263 1991 Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 76(3)(a), art. 65(supervisory board),
art. 67(a)(administrative board). See Explanatory Memorandum to 1991 Directive, supra note
44, art. 5, at 3.
264 1991 Amended Directive, supra note 44, art. 5. This model is based on the Franco-
Italian systems. See generally HANDBOOK, supra note 259 (chapters on France & Italy).
265 Commentary to 1989 Directive, supra note 28, art. 5.
266 Explanatory Memorandum to 1991 Directive, supra note 44, art. 5, at 3. See 1991
Amended Regulation, supra note 44, art. 64(supervisory board); art. 67(administrative board).
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count of any information on any undertakings controlled by the SE
which might have an appreciable impact on the progress of the SE's
business." 267 The board shall "without delay supply to the separate
body any information which may have significant implications for the
SE's situation." 268 The separate body may demand information on
"any matter concerning conditions of employment" 269 and demand
"to examine all documents submitted to the general meeting. ' 270
Also, the decisions listed in article 72 of the Regulation "may be ef-
fected only after the separate body has been informed and con-
sulted."'271 Beyond these basic rights, the member states can
continue to offer rights presently available or confer additional rights
on employees' representatives under national laws.2 72
c. Other Models
The third model allows for collective bargaining between labor
and management to determine other forms of employee involve-
ment. 273 At a minimum, the employees or their representatives will
be entitled to the same information and consultation referred to in
the separate body model.2 74 This model also binds the employees to
"observe the necessary discretion in relation to any confidential in-
formation." 275 If the bargaining parties cannot reach an agreement,
the member state where the SE is registered can offer a "standard
model . . . [which] shall guarantee for the employees at least the
rights of information and consultation provided for by this Arti-
cle." 2 76 This method of last resort appears to open the door to na-
267 1991 Amended Directive, supra note 44, art. 5(2).
268 Id. art. 5(2)(a).
269 Id. art. 5(2)(b).
270 Id. art. 5(2)(c).
271 Id. art. 5(2)(d).
272 Id. arts. 5; 10; Explanatory Memorandum to 1991 Directive, supra note 44, art. 5. The
Commission pledged that:
this Directive, which lays down rules on employee participation in cer-
tain strategic decisions at the top of the SE, is in no way to detract from the
rights enjoyed by employees' representatives in factories, plants and estab-
lishments in the Member States: Betriebsrite, shop-stewards, d~lgu~s du
personnel, works councils, etc. will retain all their rights to represent the
employees.
Explanatory Memorandum to 1991 Directive, supra note 44, at art. 10, at 6.
273 1991 Amended Directive, supra note 44, art. 6. This model is based on the British
model of collective bargaining. See generally United Kingdom, in HANDBOOK, supra note 259.
The United States uses the same basic system. Zackson, Worker Participation: Industrial De-
mocracy and Managerial Perogative in the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden and the United States,
8 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 93, 95-96 (1984).
274 1991 Amended Directive, supra note 44, art. 6(2)(a)-(d).
275 1991 Amended Directive, supra note 44, art. 6(4). Their obligation to confidentiality
continues "even after their duties have ceased." Id.
276 Id. art. 6(8). The 1989 proposal required that "[the standard model] shall be in
conformity with the most advanced national practices and shall ensure employees at least
the rights to information and consultation provided for by this Article." 1989 Directive,
supra note 28, art. 6(8). The Commission explained this deletion in the current proposal:
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tional legislation on employee participation. 277
2. Parliament's Amendments to the Directive
Parliament takes an even more liberal approach to worker par-
ticipation than the Commission. This is evidenced by the series of
over thirty amendments proposed by the Parliament's Committee on
Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights, 78 the majority of which were ac-
tually adopted by the Parliament. 279  The amendments were
designed to strengthen worker participation in decision-making and
increase representational rights. The Commission heeded many of
Parliament's suggestions in drafting the current proposal,2 80 yet
some of the more progressive suggestions were left untouched.
a. Arbitration
The Commission rejected Parliament's amendment providing
for arbitration of disputes between employers and workers before a
non-judicial agency in the member state where the SE has its regis-
tered office. 28' The amendment allowed employers and workers to
arbitrate a wide range of aspects of worker participation.28 2 Earlier
Commission proposals called for an arbitration board composed of
employees and management,2 83 but until the amendment the idea of
dispute settlement by a third party had not been suggested. Given
"it would have been difficult to apply, given the very rapid developments in the national
practices in the field." Explanatory Memorandum to 1991 Directive, supra note 44, art. 6, at 4.
277 The Commentary explains that the Commission reluctantly accepted this "stan-
dard model" provision, and only on the condition that employees be entitled to all rights
under the Directive, including those on quarterly information (article 6(2)(a)), and infor-
mation and consultation provisions for decisions listed under article 72 of the Regulation
(article 6(2)(b)). Commentary to 1989 Directive, supra note 28, at art. 6.
278 REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS AND CITI-
ZENS' RIGHTS ON THE PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE ON THE STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COM-
PANY WITH REGARD TO EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT Uan. 18, 1991), reprinted in Multinational
Service I (Jan. 1991)(European Information Service); see also European Report, Company
Law: European Parliament to Discuss Controversial European Statute 5, European Information
ServiceJan. 19, 1991.
279 See Company Law: Parliament Approves Draft Directive and Regulation on European Com-
pany Statute, 8 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 5, at 172 (Jan. 30, 1991).
280 Among the Parliament amendments adopted by the Commission is a provision to
set up a Contact Committee to "facilitate ... application of this directive ... [and] advise
the Commission, if necessary, on additions or amendments to this directive." 1991
Amended Directive, supra note 44, art. 1 la(l); Parliament First Reading, supra note 43, new art.
1 c(l) (amendment 29). The Committee will be "composed of representatives of the
Member States, of the social partners and of the Commission" and chaired by a represen-
tative of the Commission. 1991 Amended Directive, supra note 44, art. I Ia(2); Parliament First
Reading, supra note 43, new art. 1 lc(2)(amendment 29).
281 Parliament First Reading, supra note 43, new art. 1 (b) (amendment 28). Arbitration
would occur "before a non-judicial agency responsible for ensuring the proper application
of national labour law." Id.
282 See id.
283 1975 Amended Proposal, supra note 18, arts. 126-29, at 64-65. See Kolvenbach, supra
note 25, at 768.
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that employee-management negotiations play a crucial role in the
creation of an SE, the Commission was understandably reluctant to
allow third party intervention.
b. European Works Council
Parliament also included a series of amendments for the forma-
tion of a European Works Council (EWC) in SEs. 28 4 These amend-
ments provide for employee participation at the shop floor level 28 5
for matters concerning more than one establishment not located in
the same member state. 286 Both the 1970 and 1975 Commission
proposals contained provisions similar to those suggested by Parlia-
ment. 28 7 An EWC would co-exist with national employees' repre-
sentative bodies and deal with problems which arise from the
European dimension of the SE. Every SE or subsidiary with estab-
lishments in at least two countries employing over 100 workers in
each would be required to form an EWC.2 a8 The EWC would inter-
vene in employer-worker disputes concerning cross-national matters
which cannot be settled by employees or representatives within the
establishment.2 8 9 The EWC would have the right to receive quar-
terly reports dealing with the employment situation in the SE, pro-
duction and investment, rationalization projects, production and
working methods, and "any other fact or project which may have an
appreciable effect on the interests of workers of the SE and of under-
takings controlled by the SE." 290 The EWC would also be consulted
on any decision concerning vocational training programs, the intro-
284 Parliament First Reading, supra note 43, amendments 22-24. UNICE opposes provi-
sions for an EWC in the European Company Statute. See UNICE, Avis du Parliament
Europien sur le Statut de la SociteiEuropdenne, March 13, 1991, at 3 ("Des dispositions dans le
Statut de la Soci6t6 Europenne concernant 1'6tablissement d'un conseil d'entreprise in-
troduiraient inutilement dans le d~bat sur la Soci~t6 europ~enne des complications de
nature i compromettre gravement son approbation.")
285 Employee participation can occur at various levels of the company structure. The
term "shop floor level" is used to indicate those forms of participation from below, as
institutionalized in factories by a works councils, "shop stewards" (Britain), "comit6s
d'entreprise" (France), "Betriebsrat" (Germany), etc. See generally General Section, in HAND-
BOOK, supra note 259, at 12-20.
Another type of employee participation can occur through ownership in the company.
Employees can participate in asset formation or profit sharing schemes. See General Section,
in HANDBOOK, supra note 259, at 17.
286 Parliament First Reading, supra note 43, amendment 24, new art. 10a, at 108.
287 The early Commission proposals provided for the formation of European Works
Councils composed of employee representatives from the SEs various establishments
throughout the Community. The 1975 proposal granted the EWC certain information
and consultation rights. 1975 Amended Proposal, supra note 18, arts. 120-25. The manage-
ment board would have to seek agreement from the EWC in order to make decisions of
particular importance to workers. Id. arts. 123-25. See also HANDBOOK, supra note 259, at
765-67.
288 Parliament First Reading, supra note 43, new art. 10(2) (amendment No. 23)(the 1975
Proposal had set the threshold number of workers in foreign establishments at 50).
289 Id. new art. 10(a), at 108.
290 Id. new art. 10(b)(3), at 108.
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duction of new technologies, closure or transfer of establishments,
substantial reduction of activities of the SE, and substantial organiza-
tional changes within the SE. 29 1
3. Draft Directive on European Works Councils in Community-
Scale Undertakings or Groups of Undertakings
Although the Commission did not adopt Parliament's ideas for
an EWC in the current proposal for a European Company Statute, it
drafted a separate directive on the establishment of an EWC in Com-
munity-scale undertakings or groups of undertakings.2 92 The draft
Directive allows employees to participate at the shop floor level in
decisions which are likely to affect them, yet are made outside the
member state where they are employed. The draft Directive on
EWCs is designed "to improve the provision of information to and
the consultation of employees" 293 in "[undertakings] with at least
1,000 employees within the Community and at least two establish-
ments [or group undertakings] in different Member States each of
which employs at least 100 employees within the Community. '294
Thus, the Commission's draft Directive on EWCs seeks to harmonize
the level of information and consultation which large EC-wide com-
panies would provide their employees in different member states.
Creation of an EWC under the draft Directive is largely based on
collective bargaining principles. Employees or central management
can convene a meeting of a "special negotiating body," composed of
employees representatives from all establishments employing at least
100 people, and open negotiations for creation of an EWC.29 5 The
employees' representatives and the company's central manage-
ment 29 6 will draw up a written agreement as to "[t]he nature, compo-
sition, competence and mode of operation of the EWC."'297 Each
member state can allow the central management of undertakings in
its territory to withhold disclosure of information which would "sub-
291 Parliament First Reading, supra note 43, new art. 10(d)(1)(a)-(e).
292 Proposalfor a Council Directive on the establishment of a European Works Council in Commu-
nity-Scale Undertakings or Groups of Undertakings for the Purposes of Informing and Consulting Em-
ployees, 34 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 39) 10 (1991)(submitted by the Commission on Dec.
12, 1990) [hereinafter Proposed EWC Directive]. The draft Directive is based on Article 100
of the EEC Treaty and therefore requires unanimous voting.
For a discussion of the relationship between the Commission's draft Directive on
EWCs and Parliament's suggestions for EWCs in SEs, see Kolvenbach, Europaische Be-
triebsrate-Neve Initiativen, 15 BD Heft 805 (1991).
293 Id. art. 1.
294 Id. art. 2.
295 Id. art. 5(3).
296 In "community-scale groups of undertakings," the employees will meet with the
"controlling undertaking," i.e., the shareholder or member of another company with cor-
porate control. See id. art. 3.
297 Id. art. 5. The agreements shall include the terms set out in article 6(a)-(e).
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stantially damage the interest of the undertaking concerned. ' 298 In
any event, member states must require EWC members to keep dis-
closed information in confidence. 299
The parties can also agree not to set up an EWC, but certain
minimum information and consultation requirements must be
met.300 The minimum requirements include the right to meet with
the central management at least once a year and be informed about
"[the undertaking's] structure, economic and financial situation, the
probable development of the business and of production and sales,
the employment situation and probable trend, and investment pros-
pects." 30' The employees also have the right to be informed and
consulted "about any management proposal likely to have serious
consequences for the interests of the employees of the undertak-
ing." °30 2 Information and consultation will concern matters which
are which are likely to affect the undertaking as a whole or at least
two of its establishments located in different member states.303 Man-
agement must bear the operating expenses of the EWC, including
the cost of meeting facilities and travel and accommodation expenses
of members of the EWC.3 0 4
Although the draft Directive relies on collective bargaining prin-
ciples to establish an EWC, it mandates minimum information and
consultation rights. The draft has been called a "mini-Vredeling"
Directive and has already received a considerable amount of criti-
cism. 30 5 It is slated for implementation by the member states by De-
cember 31, 1992. If adopted on time, the draft Directive will be in
place if the European Company Statute takes force on January 1,
1993, and apply to large SEs too. In contrast to the draft Directive,
the European Company Statute takes the view that there is no need
for a supranational system of shop floor level information and con-
sultation to be imposed on SEs in particular.306 The European Com-
298 Id. art. 8(1).
299 Id. art. 8(2).
300 Id. art. 6(2).
301 Id. annex (l)(c).
302 Id. annex (l)(d).
303 Id. annex (l)(a).
304 Id. annex (1)(g).
305 See, e.g., UNICE, "Information/Consultation" Position Paper, Mar. 4, 1991 (UNICE
finds the proposal "harmful, dangerous and therefore totally unacceptable"); American
Chamber of Commerce, EC Committee Position Statement, Feb. 13, 1991 (EC Committee says
proposed Directive "is misguided and should be rejected"); Works Councils for EC Compa-
nies, Fin. Times, Business Law Brief, Feb. 1991 (British Department of Employment criti-
cizes draft as "inflexible and costly"); Don't Forget to Tell the Workers, THE ECONOMIST, Dec.
1, 1990, at 82 (unionists criticize the proposal as not giving workers authority beyond
mere consultation, employers criticize the proposal as undermining national law and local
management); Baker & McKenzie (London), Europe 1992 Workshop on Employment Issues,
Dec. 13, 1990, at 32 (citing problems of confidentiality, insider trading, information in
moments of crisis).
306 See 1991 Amended Directive, supra note 44, art. 10.
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pany Statute makes clear that its employee participation schemes will
"in no way to detract from the rights enjoyed by employees' repre-
sentatives in factories, plants establishments in the Member
States." 30 7 Instead, the Statute's focus is on participation in the su-
pervision and strategic development of the SE by participation at the
board level, on a separate body, or by other methods determined by
collective bargaining. Had the Commission mandated special shop
floor participation provisions for SEs, opposition to the European
Company Statute's already contested employee involvement provi-
sions might have been even greater.
C. Opposing Traditions and Views
The European Company Statute's employee involvement provi-
sions are causing heated debate across the EC and among other ob-
servers. The issue of worker participation/employee involvement30 8
is politically charged by pressures from labor and industry.30 9 It is
also a source of great controversy among the member states who
have very different traditions concerning worker participation.310
1. Germany
Germany has a longstanding history of worker involvement at
both the shop floor and the board levels. 31' Early legislation pro-
vided for elected "worker committees" who represented both the
employer and the workers and dealt with matters concerning work
rules, social welfare institutions, and employer-employee dis-
putes.312 This early form of"co-determination" became characteris-
tic of employee-employer relations in Germany. In 1905, the first
compulsory system of worker committees were made mandatory
in the mining industry, and by 1918, the worker committees became
mandatory in every business employing more than twenty work-
307 Explanatory Memorandum to Directive, supra note 44, art. 10, at 6.
308 Recent legislation uses the "employee involvement" terminology because "worker
participation" was thought to imply more stringent worker rights. This author uses the
terms interchangeably, not intending one to be more loaded than the other.
309 For labor and union views, see Unions Fear EC May Dilute Worker-Director Proposals,
Fin. Times, Dec. 9, 1988, at 12, col. 5 (European trade union leaders); Help Urged to Boost
Employee Involvement, Fin. Times, Mar. 5, 1990, at 10,.col. 3 (Industrial Society). For em-
ployers' and industry's views, see European Company Statute: Threatened by Thatcher, TiE
ECONOMIST, June 3, 1989, at 68 (European Employers Federation (UNICE)); Fears Voiced
Over European Draft on Worker Directors, Fin. Times, Mar. 9, 1990, at 13 (Engineering Em-
ployers Federation).
310 For a concise survey of worker participation legislation in the EC Member States,
see Kolvenbach, The Evolving Concept of European Labor Relations Legislation, 3 Nw. J. Irr'L L.
& Bus. 535 (1981). For a more in depth view, see HANDBOOK, supra note 259.
311 See Hanau, Federal Republic of Germany, in HANDBOOK, supra note 259, at 3-22 (shop
floor level), 23-38 (board level). See also Wiedemann, Codetermination by Workers in German
Enterprises, 28 Am. J. Comp. L. 79, 81-83 (plant level), 79-81 (enterprise level)(1980).
312 Hanau, supra note 311, at 3.
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ers.3 1 3  Modern legislation provides for "works councils" to repre-
sent all employees in establishments with five or more full-time
employees, regardless whether the employees are members of trade
unions or not. The number of members, election procedure, and
term of office is legislated in detail. Members are released from work
duties without loss of pay, protected from dismissal, and bound to
secrecy. The works council represents the employees in a wide range
of social, personnel, and economic matters such as negotiations with
employers about wages, factory conditions, and grievance
disputes.31 4
German company law has developed as a two-tier board system
(supervisory board and management board). Until co-determination
laws were enacted, the supervisory board was appointed by share-
holders. 315 In 1922, the first legislation providing for employee rep-
resentation on supervisory councils of companies was enacted. 3 16
German co-determination subsequently evolved through experimen-
tation with different models of worker representation on company
boards.3 17 In 1976, Germany passed the Co-Determination Act 3 18
which applies today.3 19 The Act provides for mandatory co-determi-
nation to companies with more than 2,000 employees (counting ex-
ecutive staff).3 20 It requires that one half of the supervisory board's
members be elected by employees and one half by shareholders.3 2 1
The Act addresses the rights and duties of supervisory board mem-
bers and gives individual members the right to demand certain infor-
mation from the entire board.322 Thus, employee supervisory board
members have extensive information and consultation rights.
In light of this tradition, Germany welcomes even the most lib-
eral of the Statute's worker participation provisions.3 23 Germany
was particularly concerned that the SE structure not become a vehi-
cle to circumvent its national system of two-tier boards and
313 Id. at 3-4.
314 See Richardi, Worker Participation in Decisions Within Undertakings in the Federal Republic
of Germany, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 23, 42-44 (1982); Lutter, The German System of Worker Participa-
tion in Practice, 3J. Bus. L. 154, 156-57 (1982).
315 Hanau, supra note 311, at 24.
316 Id. at 23 (citing Reichgesetzblatt 209 (1922)).
317 See id. at 23-3 1, discussing legislation enacted in 1951 ("parity co-determination"),
1952 ("one-third determination"), and 1976 ("quasi-parity co-determination").
318 Gesetz uber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer, Bundesgestzblatt, Teil I 1153
(1976).
319 The West German Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Codetermination Act in 1980. See Streeter, Co-Determination in West Germany - Through the
Best (and Worst) of Times, 58 Cni.[-]KE Tr L. REV. 981, 987-90 (1982); Weidermann,
Codetermination by Workers in German Enterprises, 28 AM.J. COMP. L. 79, 83-92 (1980).
320 Hanau, supra note 311, at 33.
321 Id. at 34.
322 Id. at 37-38.
323 West Germany: Co-Determination a Key Way to Shop Floor Peace, Fin. Times, Oct. 30,
1989.
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codetermination.3 24 The current proposal allows Germany to re-
strict the choice of worker participation models available to SEs reg-
istering in Germany to the codetermination model.3 2 5 Germany sees
the worker participation provisions as useful in preventing "social
dumping" - "competition from low-wage companies in member
states with poor industrial democracy."3 26
2. Britain
Britain does not have a tradition of worker participation in cor-
porate decision-making; it has historically dealt with employee-
worker relations through the "shop steward" system and collective
bargaining.3 27 The "shop steward" system is one of the earliest
forms of interaction between an employer and his workers.3 28 Shop
stewards were originally appointed by trade union members to col-
lect fees. Over time their responsibilities increased to conducting
negotiations between the trade union and the workers and, eventu-
ally, between trade unions and management. 329 Today shop stew-
ards function as shop floor representatives for the trade union
members. They help solve grievances and negotiate collective bar-
gaining agreements with management on behalf of trade union
members.3 3 0
The broader concept of "collective bargaining" has become the
classic form of labor-management interaction in Britain. Collective
bargaining refers to "negotiations between employers and the
workforce whereby the workforce acts in concert and the 'employer
meets with a collective will, and settles in a single agreement the
principle upon which, for the time being, all workmen of a particular
group, or class, or grade will be engaged.' ",331 Through collective
bargaining, trade unions make demands for work condition, wages,
working weeks, overtime rates, etc.3 32 An important characteristic of
these systems is that they are entirely voluntary and that the level of
worker input varies widely among industries and between firms in
the same industry.
There is no history of worker representation on private corpo-
rate boards and, until recently, little interest. In 1977, the Bullock
Report 333 explored the various prospects of a system of industrial
324 Id.
325 Memorandum, supra note 24, at 15.
326 Fin. Times, July 19, 1989, at 2, col. 4.
327 See Hepple, What About the Workers?, 39 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 259, 260 (1986), See
generally Kolvenbach, United Kingdom, in HANDBOOK, supra note 259.
328 Kolvenbach, supra note 327, at 4.
329 Id.
330 Id. at 12.
331 Id. at 7 (quoting S. WEBB & B. WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 173 (1902)).
332 Id.
333 HMSO London 1977.
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democracy and concluded that employee participation on boards was
desirable.3 34 The Bullock Report caused a great deal of controversy
and was rejected by industry and the Government in favor of contin-
ued non-statutory, individualized cooperation between employers
and employees.33 5
Given this tradition based on voluntariness and individual em-
ployer-employee initiatives for cooperation, Britain opposes the
worker participation provisions of the Statute. 336 Britain particularly
protests any mandatory forms of worker participation. 337 Britain
continues to insist that matters of employee involvement are best de-
cided on a voluntary basis between employers and employees.3 38
Furthermore, Britain is wary of any EC measure which seems like
"social engineering" and argues that such measures will unduly in-
terfere with free market forces. 339 Most member states disagree with
Britain's views and support some form of industrial democracy at the
EC level. Given the legal base of majority voting, it is unlikely that
Britain will be able to rally enough opposition to defeat the statute
on this basis alone.
VI. Conclusion
It is hard to make arguments against cooperation, convenience,
and increased social rights, especially when the benefits they bring
are completely voluntary. The European Company Statute is in-
tended to promote industrial cooperation by enabling companies
who opt for SE status to avoid the multiplicity of tax and reporting
regulations of the various member states. The Regulation will offer
an unprecedented company structure for large-scale cross-border ac-
tivity and will be especially useful in facilitating research and technol-
ogy cooperation. At the same time, it takes the view that company
profit-maximization is compatible with social rights. The Directive
aims to promote industrial democracy through a range of methods
334 HANDBOOK, supra note 259, at 20-21. See also Lewis & Clark, Reports of Committees:
The Bullock Report, 40 MODERN L. REV. 323 (1977).
335 Kolvenbach, supra note 327, at 26-27 (citing Government White Paper of 23 May
1978, HMSO London 1978).
336 See European Company Statute: Threatened by Thatcher, THE EcONOMIST, June 3, 1989,
at 68; Fowler Attacks EC's Proposal to Enforce Worker Involvement, Fin. Times, Oct. 23, 1989, at
12.
337 See DTI Consultative Document, supra note 53, at 9; Fin. Times, May 15, 1989, at 6,
col. I.
338 DTI Consultative Document, supra note 53, at 9.
339 Fin. Times, Oct. 17, 1988, at 4, col. 1. Mrs. Thatcher commented on the EC's
overall "social dimension": "We emphatically do not need new regulations which raise
the cost of employment and make Europe's labour market less flexible." THE ECONOMIST,
Apr. 8, 1989, at 56. Yet the post-Thatcher government may be more amenable to the
worker participation initiatives. Fin. Times, Jan. 23, 1991 ("British MEPs Shift on Worker
Participation"). The House of Commons passed the proposed European Statute by a mar-
gin of 63-4. 92 ParI. Deb., H.C. (Ser.) 149 (1990).
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for worker participation inspired by traditions developed in several
of the EC nations. In addition, the advent of a single legal corporate
entity for cross-border business activity represents an important step
in the drive to create a single European market place.
It is easier to criticize the Statute for lack of clarity and compre-
hensiveness and to be suspicious of its inroads on managerial and
national sovereignty, especially when its basis in law is questionable.
On one hand, the Statute leaves many areas open, only to be filled in
by existing national legislation. Presumably those opting for SE sta-
tus do so to avoid the confusion of operating in multiple legal sys-
tems. Furthermore, the models of worker participation are far from
analogous and may lead to different degrees of involvement depend-
ing on the member state's restriction of choices available to its
SEs. 340 If Germany and Britain can insist that all SEs registering
within its borders follow the approach based on their own systems,
then little is achieved by an EC initiative to promote social rights.34'
On the other hand, the Statute's eagerness to offer tax incen-
tives and a progressive approach to employee involvement may be
overstepping the legal authority for ununanimous Council action.
Member states have been wary of allowing the EC to prescribe a so-
cial agenda for business relations in their nations. There is a lot to
be said for the various European nations remaining laboratories for
various approaches to company law and management-labor rela-
tions. 342 The United States is a leading example that a single system
of company legislation is not essential.
In sum, the European Company Statute can be criticized as do-
ing "too little" and "too much" at the same time. But the European
Community as an institution has been facing this kind of criticism
from day one. Despite its present shortcomings, the Statute's aims
are commendable. Of the European Company initiatives to date, its
potential to have a positive impact on EC company law i's quite good.
BARBARA E. HOECKLIN
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